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Abstract
Essays on Capital Structure and Institutional Ownership
by
Yuan Feng
Adviser: Professor Armen Hovakimian
This dissertation consists of three chapters about how institutional ownership and trading
affect capital structure.
Chapter 1 The literature documents that firms issue equity following periods of high stock
return and such behavior only occurs in concert with high returns that coincide with large
amounts of buying by new institutions. My findings suggest this is also associated with strong
institutional selling, the opposite of what one would expect. This positive relationship is not
driven by outflow-motivated selling, but rather by informed selling by short-term institutions.
Chapter 2 I document a strong negative relationship between institutional ownership
and leverage. I find evidence that long-term institutions affect firm financing following
the pecking order. They influence firms to use more internal financing, and more debt
than equity when external financing is needed. While the preference of debt over equity
when using external financing would lead to higher leverage, using more internal financing
dominates this positive effect, resulting in lower leverage.
Chapter 3 I examine whether institutional investors have preferences for firms’ leverage
ratios, and if so, whether the said preference affect firms’ financing decisions. I find sup-
porting evidence for the first question but opposing evidence for the second question. The
conclusions hold in both firm-level and institution-firm-level analysis.
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Chapter 1
The Other Side of Institutional
Trading
1.1 Introduction
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), including what causes a firm to issue SEOs and the ef-
fect of issuance on firm stock price, have been widely studied. Although evidence suggests
that firms issue SEOs for many reasons, including investment opportunities, optimal capital
structure, and signaling, timing is the most prominent reason. The market timing hypoth-
esis is based on the concept that firms possess private information about themselves and
are better equipped, compared to investors, to identify and possibly take advantage of times
when they are overvalued.
Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Huang and Ritter (2009)
find direct evidence that firms tend to issue equity when their market values are high relative
to book or past market values, and Asquith and Mullins (1986), Loughran and Ritter (1995),
Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (1997) interpret low post-issue
stock returns as evidence of market timing. Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and
1
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Harris (1984), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Pagano et al. (1998) and Hovakimian et al. (2001)
do no fully support the market timing theory of capital structure, but document results that
support that firms time equity issuance.
Altı and Sulaeman (2012) have discovered another important factor to the market timing
story. They find that firms time only high returns that are supported by large institutional
demand when it comes to SEOs. High institutional demand can validate a more informative
price and, in doing so, can reduce adverse selection. Lower adverse selection facilitates a
more receptive market for the firm so that it issues equity without substantially depressing
the stock price.
In their search for proxies for market reception, they start with new institutional buying
and changes in the existing institutional holdings. For each firm, new institutional buying
is the number of new institutions who are buying the stocks of this firm, and changes in the
existing institutional holdings is the number of existing institutions that are buying minus
the number of institutions who are selling.
New institutional buying come about because new institutional buying can ”significantly
predict SEO announcements,” and thus a good proxy for market reception. Meanwhile,
changes in the existing institutional holdings is dropped because it does not play a substantial
role in predicting SEO announcements.
My motivation in this chapter comes from the preliminary results of the dropped variable:
changes in the existing institutional holdings. Unlike the monotonically positive relationship
between new institutional buying and SEO announcement likelihood, the relationship for
changes in the existing institutional holdings is not monotonic. Instead, a U-shaped variation
exists: when change in existing institutional holdings is near zero, that is, the numbers of
institutions buying and selling are close, the likelihood of an SEO announcement is the
lowest. When changes in the existing institutional holdings is positive and increases as the
number of buyers exceeds the number of sellers, the likelihood of an SEO announcement
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increases. When changes in the existing institutional holdings is negative and decreases as
the number of sellers exceeds the number of buyers, the likelihood of an SEO announcement
continues to increase.
This is surprising and interesting in two ways. To begin with, on the topic of market
reception, institutions are specifically chosen in this study because of their crucial informa-
tional role in the stock market. Thus whether or not the institutional buyers are existing
shareholders of the firm is inconsequential. The positive side of changes in the existing
institutional holdings support this.
In addition, when changes in the existing institutional holdings is negative, the more
institutions sell than buy, the more SEOs are announced. If institutional buying can facilitate
a more informative price, and thus a more receptive market, institutional selling can facilitate
a more informative price as well and thus a less receptive market. This should impede equity
issuance, not facilitate, which is what has been preliminarily showcased in the results.
In this paper, I verify this positive relationship and highlight its origination from the
institutional selling. I also attempt to address why this relationship is positive. Institutions
sell for two possible reasons, one of which is based on liquidity. For example, the institution
may have a large withdraw to fulfill, a higher cushion requested by regulators, etc. The other
reason is based on information, such as institutions find the firm to be overvalued, or has
another firm with better growth opportunities.
The tests have yielded some intriguing results. First, liquidity-driven selling has a neg-
ative impact on the likelihood of SEO announcements as the market reception story would
predict. Second, decomposing the institutions by their trading frequency, short-term insti-
tutional selling plays the key role of predicting SEO announcements.
This is not too surprising as short-term institutions are usually perceived as better in-
formed and more focused on exploiting market timing opportunities whereas long-term insti-
tutions are usually perceived as monitors and more focused on long-term development of the
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firm. Thus in an overvaluation situation, short-term institutions are more likely to sell the
firm, whereas long-term institutions may overpass the opportunity and aim for firm growth.
If firms also believe themselves to be overvalued, they may choose to issue equity. When
short-term institutions sell, the firm may be in a period of overvaluation, which means a
higher probability for the firm to believe that it is overvalued itself, and in this way, SEO
announcements are predictable.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data, describes the key vari-
able definitions, and reports the summary statistics. Section 1.3 verifies the strong positive
relationship between institutional selling and SEO announcements. Section 1.4 attempts to
address the factor behind the negative relationship. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data and Definitions
1.2.1 Data and Sample Construction
I obtain accounting data from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly, excluding foreign firms,
financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999). I acquire stock
characteristics from monthly equity CRSP stock return database and exclude all securities
that do not have a share code of 10 or 11. I use data from the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) to identify SEO filing announcements dates, where spin-offs, unit offers, and rights
offerings are excluded. Institutional trading data are from the Thomson Financial 13F
Institutional Holdings database. Following Altı and Sulaeman (2012), I also exclude firms
from the sample if they fall in one of the following criteria: firms that have had an initial
public offering (IPO) and SEOs within the previous two quarters of a SEO event. The
full sample includes 325,201 firm-quarter observations and 3,517 SEO announcements from
1985Q1 to 2014Q4.
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1.2.2 Definitions of Institutional Trading Variables
Thomson Financial 13F reports quarterly snapshots of institutional investors’ portfolios filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I calculate the differences between
two consecutive quarters as institutions’ quarterly trading volume. The shares reported in
the 13F Institutional Holdings database are adjusted for stock splits that occur between
reported date and filing date. To correctly calculate the quarterly change, I adjust the
shares by using the CRSP’s variable ”Cumulative Factor to Adjust Shares Outstanding.”
I use the number of shares traded by institutions as the main measure of institutional
trading. Below, are the detailed definitions of the share-based measures, normalized by
institutional ownership:
New holdings 1 i,t =
Shares initiated by institutions i,t
Total shares owned by institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.1)
Increased holdings 1 i,t =
Shares purchased by existing institutions i,t
Total shares owned by institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.2)
Decreased holdings 1 i,t =
Shares sold (but not liquidated) by existing institutions i,t
Total shares owned by institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.3)
Terminated holdings 1 i,t =
Shares liquidated by existing institutions i,t
Total shares owned by institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.4)
Change in existing holdings 1 i,t =
Shares (purchased− sold) by existing institutions i,t
Total shares owned by institutional shareholders i,t−1.
(1.5)
I also adopt the count-based measure that Altı and Sulaeman (2012) use in their paper
as a robustness check. Sias et al. (2006) report that the number of institutions is a better
proxy for institutional investor demand. The detailed variable definitions are listed below.
The count-based New holdings 2, Change in existing holdings 2, and Terminated holdings 2
have the exact same definition used in Altı and Sulaeman (2012). Increased holdings 2
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and Decreased holdings 2 are new and are defined in a fashion similar to the former three
variables.
Below, are the detailed definitions of the count-based measures, normalized by the
number of institutional shareholders:
New holdings 2 i,t =
Number of institutions that initiated i,t
Total number of institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.6)
Increased holdings 2 i,t =
Number of existing institutions that purchased i,t
Total number of institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.7)
Decreased holdings 2 i,t =
Number of existing institutions that sold (but not liquidated) i,t
Total number of institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.8)
Terminated holdings 2 i,t =
Number of existing institutions that liquidated i,t
Total number of institutional shareholders i,t−1,
(1.9)
Change in existing holdings 2 i,t =
Number of existing institutions that (purchased i,t − sold i,t)
Total number of institutional shareholders i,t−1.
(1.10)
1.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used in this chapter. Panel A and
B report the share-based and count-based measures for the institutional trading variables,
respectively. By construction, share-based variables New holdings 1 , Increased holdings 1 ,
Decreased holdings 1 , Terminated holdings 1, Institutional buying 1, and Institutional sell-
ing 1 are positive, and they are all trimmed at the top 1%. Change in existing holdings 1 can
be either positive or negative and is trimmed at both the top and the bottom 1%. Among
count-based variables, only New holdings 2 and Institutional buying 2 have extreme values
and are trimmed at the top 1%.
Panel C reports other firm characteristics, among which profitability, investment, R&D
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are trimmed at both the top and the bottom 1%. Market-to-book is trimmed at the top
1% and negative values are dropped. Stock return, turnover, and volatility are trimmed
at the top 1%. Observations with values below 0 or above 1 for tangibility, leverage, and
institutional ownership are dropped.
1.3 Institutional Selling and SEO Announcement
In this section, I present my first set of results that relate the probability of an SEO an-
nouncement to institutional selling, in comparison to buying. All the analysis are at the
quarterly frequency. For ease of comparison to Altı and Sulaeman (2012) and considera-
tion of plausible non-linear relationships, I first report the results in quintile sorts and then
confirm the findings with probit regressions.
1.3.1 Bivariate Sorts between Stock Return and Institutional Trad-
ing Variables
Table 1.2 reports the likelihood of an SEO announcement. In Panel A, firms are indepen-
dently sorted into quintiles based on the previous quarter’s raw stock return. Time-series
means of the stock return and SEO announcement probabilities are reported. Firms in higher
return quintiles are much more likely to announce SEOs than the ones in lower return quin-
tiles. The difference of SEO announcement probabilities between the highest and the lowest
stock return quintile is both economically and statistically significant. Firms in the highest
stock return quintile have a probability of 2.629%, or about five times the probability of the
lowest stock return quintile. Panel A confirms the well-documented fact in the literature
that equity issuance follows periods of high stock returns.
Next, the analysis proceeds to the effects of institutional trading on the probability of
an SEO announcement along with the stock return. Panel B confirms the main finding in
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Altı and Sulaeman (2012). In each quarter, firms are independently sorted into quintiles
based on the previous quarter’s raw stock return and New holdings 1. Within each of the
25 groups, I calculate the percentage of firms that announce an SEO during the quarter.
Focusing on the high stock return column from Altı and Sulaeman (2012), when the firm
falls in the lowest New holdings 1 quintile, the likelihood of an SEO announcement is only
0.806% despite the high stock return. This is quite low, whereas the likelihood shoots up to
4.307% when both the stock return and New holdings 1 are in the highest quintile.
Altı and Sulaeman (2012) have shown that this can be explained by market reception.
Firms only time equity issuance in response to high returns that coincides with strong institu-
tional investor demand, a proxy for market reception. Strong institutional investor demand
can facilitate a more informative price, which reduces adverse selection and increases market
reception so that firms can issue equity without depressing the stock price severely.
Altı and Sulaeman (2012) use the count-based measure Change in existing holdings 2
and find no significant effect on the probability of an SEO announcement. The share-based
measure, Change in existing holdings 1 in Panel C has no significant effect either. Change in
existing holdings excludes the effects of new institutions, and based on only the ”High minus
Low” rows of Panel B and C, one can conclude that only new institutions, not existing ones,
are of importance when firms assess market reception.
However, this preliminary conclusion does not hold up to further scrutiny. On the topic
of market reception, it should be irrelevant whether the institutional buyers are existing
shareholders of the firm. In addition, the monotonically increasing trend observed in new
holdings is absent across the five quintiles of change in existing holdings. Instead, a U-shaped
variation exists: when change in existing holdings is in its middle quintile, the likelihood of
an SEO announcement is at its lowest across all stock return columns. When change in
existing holdings is in its highest quintile, that is, when there is much more buying than
selling of existing institutions, the likelihood goes up to 3.224% in the highest stock return
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quintile. This percentage is high compared with the unconditional announcement likelihood
of 1.081% in the full sample, or the announcement likelihood of 1.615% for the middle change
in existing holdings quintile.
When change in existing holdings is in its lowest quintile, that is, when existing institu-
tions’ selling dominates their buying, the announcement likelihood reaches 3.173%, which is
almost as high as the likelihood of the highest quintile. This part of the results cannot be
explained by the market reception story, in fact, this is opposite of what the market recep-
tion story predicts. That institutional selling dominates buying indicates weak institutional
demand and thus low market reception, which should be associated with a low likelihood
of an SEO announcement. Therefore, a reason other than market reception may be driving
this positive effect.
Based on the discussion above, to study the high announcement likelihood associated with
the low change in existing holdings quintile, Change in existing holdings 1 is decomposed
into Increased holdings 1, Decreased holdings 1, and Terminated holdings 1.
Panel D sorts stock return and Increased holdings 1. In terms of market reception, high
Increased holdings 1 would mean high institutional demand. Not surprisingly, the results are
consistent with what is observed in Panel B of New holdings 1. In later analysis, Increased
holdings 1 and New holdings 1 exhibit no qualitative difference and are thus added up for
brevity. Their sum is Institutional buying 1. Panel E reports the results sorted between stock
return and Institutional buying 1, and these results are consistent with the results sorted
between the stock return and Increased holdings 1 (Panel D) or New holdings 1 (Panel A).
Panel F sorts stock return and Terminated holdings 1. If market reception can also ex-
plain the selling side of institutional trading, then a lower announcement likelihood should be
observed in the high Terminated holdings 1 quintile. If there is, indeed, a reason other than
market reception that affects institutional selling, then the higher announcement likelihood
should be observed instead. Likelihood results in Panel F supports the latter, that is, the
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higher Terminated holdings 1, the higher likelihood of an SEO announcement: in the highest
stock return quintile, the high Terminated holdings 1 quintile has a 3.876% probability of
an SEO announcement compared with 1.442% in the low quintile.
Similar results hold in Panel G for the stock return and Decreased holdings 1 sort. In the
highest stock return quintile, the high Decreased holdings 1 quintile has a 3.585% probability
of an SEO announcement compared with 1.411% in the low Decreased holdings 1 quintile.
In later analysis, Decreased holdings 1 and Terminated holdings 1 exhibit no qualitative
difference and are thus added up for brevity. Their sum is Institutional selling 1, and Panel
H reports results consistent with those in Panel F and G.
When one sells in the stock market, someone else must be buying. So firms that have
high institutional selling might be the ones whose institutional buying is high. To address
this concern, in Panel I, I sort Institutional buying 1 and Institutional selling 1. Even when
controlling for Institutional buying 1, Institutional selling 1 is not negatively associated with
SEO announcements. In the lowest and highest quintile of Institutional selling 1, the positive
effect is present and statistically significant. In the middle three quintiles, the positive effect
is still present, but not significant.
1.3.2 Multivariate Analysis
In the last section, Panels B through I are bivariate and exclude other important factors
predicting equity issuance. In this section, I employ a multivariate probit analysis to control
for these factors. Specifically, I estimate two specifications. In the first specification, the
institutional trading measures are dummy variables. The dummy form takes into account
the plausible non-linear relationship that allows for a comparison with the previous section.
In the second specification, the institutional trading measures are in continuous forms, which
might improve efficiency in econometrics terms.
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The first model specification is detailed as follows:
Pr (SEO Ann.)i,t+1 =Probit (High Inst. Buying, Medium Inst. Buying,
High Inst. Selling, Medium Inst. Selling,
Stock Return, Lagged stock return, M/B,
Firm Size Firm Age, IPO dummy, Profitability,
Tangibility, R&D, R&D dummy, Investment, Leverage,
Volatility, Turnover, Institutional Ownership,
Quarter and Industry Fixed Effects)i,t.
(1.11)
Regression 1.11 estimates the probability of firm i announcing an SEO in quarter t+1, and
the variables of interest are highlighted in bold: High (medium) institutional buying
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in quarter t if the respective institutional
buying variable is in its highest quintile (middle three quintiles) of quarter t, and High
(medium) institutional selling is set up in an identical fashion.
Lagged stock return is included to address the concern that institutional buying or insti-
tutional selling may be the result of the previous quarter’s stock return. Firm characteristics
that have been previously used in the literature are also present; stock characteristics are
included to control for other aspects of the stock. Total institutional ownership size is also
controlled for. The control variables are all measured in quarter t.
The second model specification is detailed as follows:
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Pr (SEO Ann.)i,t+1 =Probit (Inst. Buying, Inst. Selling,
Stock Return, Lagged stock return, M/B,
Firm Size Firm Age, IPO dummy, Profitability,
Tangibility, R&D, R&D dummy, Investment, Leverage,
Volatility, Turnover, Institutional Ownership,
Quarter and Industry Fixed Effects)i,t.
(1.12)
Specification 1.12 is similar to specification 1.11, except the interest variables institutional
buying and institutional selling are in continuous forms. I estimated both specifications with
the share-based definitions and the count-based definitions as a robustness check.
Table 1.3 reports the estimation results of the Probit Regression 1.11. The positive
marginal effects on High (medium) institutional selling confirms that after controlling
for other firm and stock characteristics, as institutional selling increases, the probability of
a firm announcing an SEO still increases. It is evident that this effect is independent of
institutional buying.
To intuitively gauge the impact of the positive marginal effects, I calculate the average
adjusted predictions of the probability of an SEO announcement based on specification 1.11
and share-based measures. Panel B of Table 1.4 reports these results. High institutional
buying has a 1.2579% likelihood of an SEO announcement; medium has a 0.9874% likelihood
and low has a 0.6734% likelihood, which is only 53% of the high variable. Comparatively,
when institutional selling is high, the likelihood is 1.1224% compared to 1.0507% of the
medium and 0.7157% of the low, respectively, the latter of which is only 64% of the likelihood
for high institutional selling.
Table 1.4 reports estimation results of the continuous form specification 1.12. The co-
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efficients on continuous institutional trading measures again verify the positive relationship
between institutional selling and an SEO announcement in the presence of institutional buy-
ing and other firm characters.
Count-based institutional trading variables present results qualitatively similar to the
share-based measures in both specifications. The pseudo R2 is lower in Table 1.4, so the
explanation power is actually higher when using dummy variables.
1.4 Why Does Institutional Selling Trigger SEOs?
The prediction power of institutional selling on SEO announcements is significantly positive.
Market reception cannot be the explanation because high institutional selling means a less
receptive market and thus predicts a lower probability of an SEO announcement.
To answer why institutional selling can predict SEOs, I start with why institutions sell.
Briefly summarized, there are two reasons. One is for liquidity. Institutions need cash to
fulfill withdraw requests, maintain their cash cushion, and so on. For example, they have
a large withdraw to fulfill, or a higher cushion requested by regulators. The other one is
based on information. Institutions find the firm to be overvalued, or it has another firm with
better growth opportunities.
1.4.1 Liquidity-Driven Selling
In this section, I analyze liquidity-driven institutional selling. I construct Mutual fund hy-
pothetical outflow (MFHO) following Edmans et al. (2012) and Flow-motivated fire sales
following Coval and Stafford (2007). These variables proxy for the firm selling induced by
investor outflows instead of information.
I obtain quarterly data on mutual fund holdings from CDA Spectrum/Thomson (s12),
and mutual fund flows are estimated using the CRSP series of monthly total net assets
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(TNA) and returns. I use WRDS MFLINK to link these two databases. Because the CRSP
Mutual Fund database is monthly data at the share class level, and Thomson is quarterly
data at the mutual fund level, I first convert the monthly share-class-level TNA and return
to quarterly mutual-fund-level total net assets (TA) and return.
To be included, a fund must have had at least 20 holdings at some point in the past, and
changes in TA cannot be too extreme:
−0.50 < ∆TAj,t/TAj,t−1 < 2.0.
Then the net flow of funds in dollar value to mutual fund j during quarter t is defined
as:
Flowj,t = TAj,t − TAj,t−1 × (1 +Rj,t), (1.13)
Outflowj,t = −Flowj,t/TAj,t−1, (1.14)
where TAj,t is fund j’s total assets at the end of quarter t and Rj,t is the fund-level return
for fund j over quarter t.
Following Edmans et al. (2012), I construct firm i’s Mutual fund hypothetical outflow as
MFHOi,t =
m∑
j=1
Flowj,t × si,j,t−1
V OLi,t
(1.15)
for each stock i in quarter t, and the summation is only over funds j for which
Outflowj,t ≥ 5%. The term V OLi,t is total dollar trading volume of stock i in quarter t ,
and
si,j,t =
SHARESi,j,t × PRCi,t
TAj,t
(1.16)
is the dollar value of fund j’s holdings of stock i as a proportion of fund j’s total assets
CHAPTER 1. THE OTHER SIDE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING 15
at the end of the quarter. Substitution makes my mutual fund price pressure measure
MFHOi,t =
m∑
j=1
Flowj,t × SHARESi,j,t−1 × PRCi,t−1
TAj,t−1 × V OLi,t , (1.17)
where the summation is only over funds j for which Outflowj,t ≥ 5%.
Following Coval and Stafford (2007), I construct firm i’s Flow-motivated fire sales as:
PRESSURE 1i,t =∑
j
(max(0,∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t > P (90th))−
∑
j
(max(0,−∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t < P (10th))
AvgV olumei,t−4:t−2,
(1.18)
PRESSURE 2i,t =∑
j
(max(0, f lowj,t) ·max(0,∆Holdingsj,i,t))−
∑
j
(max(0,−flowj,t) ·max(0,−∆Holdingsj,i,t))
AvgV olumei,t−4:t−2,
(1.19)
PRESSURE 3i,t =∑
j
(max(0,∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t > P (90th))−
∑
j
(max(0,−∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t < P (10th))
SharesOutstandingi,t−1.
(1.20)
Firms for whom MFHO and PRESSURE 1 2 3 are calculated must be part of my
full sample from earlier sections. The Thomson Financial 13F Institutional Holdings (S34)
and Mutual Fund Holding (S12) database differ in their original sources and in their level
of coverage, but almost every fund in the S12 set has a manager in the S34 set as well,
that is, Mutual Fund Holding (S12) is a subsample of 13F Institutional Holdings (S34), so
a negligible amount (6,787) of observations is lost as the result of this requirement: 170,192
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firm-quarter observations before merging with 13F compare with 163,405 afterwards.
To conduct my test, firms are independently sorted into quintiles based on the previous
quarter’s raw stock return and MFHO for each quarter, and the likelihood of an SEO an-
nouncements is calculated and reported in Table 1.5. PRESSURE 1, 2, and 3 are sorted
into deciles and are reported in Table 1.6. The high quintile/decile refers to the group of
firms that suffer the most from outflow-motivated mutual fund selling.
In Table 1.5, the high MFHO quintile has a significantly lower probability of an SEO
announcement compared with the low quintile. In Table 1.6, high PRESSURE 1, 2, or 3
is not associated with a significantly higher or lower likelihood compared with the low decile.
These two measures have their own perks and drawback, the details of which are unnec-
essary to expand on here. Based on the results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, I conclude that the
positive effect of institutional selling observed in prior sections cannot be explained by the
liquidity-driven sales.
1.4.2 Information-Driven elling
In this section, I test whether information-driven selling can help explain the positive re-
lationship. Institutions are decomposed into the long-, mid-, and short-term. Short-term
institutions are usually perceived as better informed and more focused on exploiting market
timing opportunities, whereas long-term institutions are usually perceived as monitors and
more focused on further development of the firm. By decomposing and comparing, the kind
of information that drives the positive relationship may surface.
I identify long- and short-term institutional investors based on their average portfolio
turnover in the last four quarters, like in Yan and Zhang (2009). Specifically, I first calculate
the aggregate purchases and sales for each institution k:
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CR buyk,t =
Nk∑
i−1
Sk,i,t>Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|, (1.21)
CR sellk,t =
Nk∑
i−1
Sk,i,t≤Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|. (1.22)
Here, Pi,t−1 and Pi,t are the share prices for stock i at the end of quarters t − 1 and t,
respectively. ∆Pi,t is Pi,t − Pi,t−1. Sk,i,t−1 and Sk,i,t are institution k’s holdings of stock i at
the end of quarters t− 1 and t, respectively. CR buyk,t and CR sellk,t denote institution k’s
aggregate purchases and sales in quarter t. The churn rate of institution k in quarter t is
then defined as
CRk,t ≡
min(CR buyk,t, CR sellk,t)
Nk∑
i=1
Sk,i,tPi,t+Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1
2
. (1.23)
I then calculate each institution’s average churn rate over the past four quarters as
AV G CRk,t =
1
4
3∑
m=0
CRk,t−m. (1.24)
Next, for each quarter, I sort all institutions into three tertile portfolios based onAV G CRk,t.
The institutions ranked in the top tertile have the highest turnover and are classified as
short-term institutional investors, whereas those ranked in the bottom tertile have the low-
est turnover and are classified as long-term institutional investors.
I then calculate long-, mid-, and short-term institutional buying and Institutional selling
accordingly. To keep my model parsimonious for the analysis that follows, I only use the
high institutional buying/selling dummy variable, and not the medium ones. Institutional
buying/selling is defined as high and takes the value of one in quarter t if the respective
variable falls in its top two quintiles. The specification is as follows:
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Pr (SEO Ann.)i,t+1 =Probit (High Long-, Mid-, Short-term Inst. Buying,
High Long-, Mid-, Short-term Inst. Selling,
Stock Return, Lagged stock return, M/B,
Firm Size Firm Age, IPO dummy, Profitability,
Tangibility, R&D, R&D dummy, Investment, Leverage,
Volatility, Turnover, Institutional Ownership,
Quarter and Industry Fixed Effects)i,t.
(1.25)
Estimation results from Regression 1.25 are reported in column (2) of Table 1.7. Only
short-term institutional selling has a positive marginal effect, whereas long- and mid-term
institutional selling are not pertinent. I also estimate the model with continuous variables
and find similar results, but, for brevity, they are not reported here.
To reiterate, the average adjusted predictions of the probability of an SEO announcement
is calculated and reported in Panel B of Table 1.7. When long-term institutional selling is
high, the probability of an SEO announcement actually drops from 1.1501% to 1.0627%.
When short-term institutional selling is high, the probability increases from 1.0099% to
1.2328%, by about 22%. The economic significance of short-term institutional selling is
plainly evident.
The different effect between long- and short-term institutional selling provides evidence
that mispricing is the explanation for the positive relationship observed between institutional
selling and SEO announcement. When the firm stock return is high, short-term institutions
that find the firm overvalued will sell the firm. The higher the return, the more short-term
institutions are likely to sell. Meanwhile, since the stock return is high, the firm is more
likely to issue equity too. Thus a positive relationship observed.
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I calculate the SEO announcement return to see if the SEO announcements preceded
by high total and short-term institutional selling would perform any differently in the mar-
ket. Tables 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10, respectively, report the results of raw, value-weighted, and
equal-weighted, market-adjusted announcement return results. The market does not react
differently to SEOs preceded by high institutional selling. I also looked into the future return
in several windows (not reported here for brevity), the firms do not perform differently when
sorted on total or short-term institutional selling.
1.5 Conclusions
The literature has provided evidence that firms tend to time their equity issuance, and that
this timing is more feasible should there be more new institutions’ buying of the firm. In this
paper,I document that, high institutional selling, accounting for institutional buying, stock
return, and other factors, positively predicts the probability of an SEO announcement.
Liquidity-driven sales cannot explain this positive relationship. In fact, the positive
relationship is directed to the sales by short-term institutions. High short-term institutional
selling is present because institutions assess a firm as overvalued. Short-term institutions
frequently trade based on proprietary information, most of which firms possess as well.
Therefore, it is very likely the firms come to the same conclusion of valuation and thus issue
equity. As a result, I observe that high short-term institutional selling can positively predict
SEO announcements.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics of institutional trading measures and other firm characteris-
tics. Market-to-book is market equity plus book debt divided by total assets. Firm size is logarithm
of total assets. Firm age is logarithm of the number of months since the first appearance in CRSP.
IPO dummy is equal to one if the firm age is less than 24 months. Profitability is quarterly operat-
ing income before depreciation divided by total assets. Tangibility is quarterly total (net) property,
plant and equipment divided by total assets. Investment is capital expenditures divided by Total
Assets. R&D is quarterly research and development expenditures divided by total assets. R&D
dummy is equal to zero if R&D is missing. Leverage is book debt divided by total assets. Volatil-
ity is standard deviation of monthly stock returns measured over past three months. Turnover is
quarterly share trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Institutional Ownership is fraction
of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors in Thomson Financial 13F.
Percentiles
Name #Obs Mean Std.Dev. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Panel A: Share-based institutional trading measure, normalized by institutional ownership
New holding 1 325,201 11.87 26.21 0.00 1.35 4.89 11.79 43.24
Increased holdings 1 325,201 8.29 8.66 0.00 2.17 6.38 11.36 24.10
Decreased holdings 1 325,201 6.38 6.09 0.00 1.32 5.16 9.50 18.06
Terminated holdings 1 325,201 5.80 9.66 0.00 0.40 2.44 6.81 23.44
Change in Existing Holding 1 325,201 −3.89 12.65 −24.95 −7.43 −2.08 0.72 11.60
Institutional Buying 1 325,201 20.15 28.69 0.00 6.38 13.55 23.51 59.49
Institutional Selling 1 325,201 12.18 11.66 0.00 4.03 9.64 16.69 34.07
Panel B: Count-based institutional trading measure, normalized by the number of institutional shareholders
New holding 2 325,201 19.65 18.30 0.00 9.52 16.00 25.00 50.00
Increased holdings 2 325,201 27.76 14.67 0.00 20.00 30.00 36.76 47.76
Decreased holdings 2 325,201 24.21 13.87 0.00 15.56 25.70 33.33 42.86
Terminated holdings 2 325,201 12.17 10.15 0.00 5.26 10.91 16.81 31.15
Change in Existing Holding 2 325,201 −8.62 21.21 −40.70 −20.00 −8.72 0.00 25.00
Institutional Buying 2 325,201 47.41 24.82 0.00 34.09 47.37 58.33 89.47
Institutional Selling 2 325,201 36.38 16.67 0.00 27.42 39.39 47.56 57.95
(to be continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Stock Return 325,201 0.02 0.27 −0.40 −0.14 0.00 0.15 0.48
M/B 325,201 1.77 1.86 0.50 0.81 1.19 1.97 4.94
Firm size 325,201 5.23 2.07 2.11 3.74 5.06 6.59 8.93
Firm age 325,201 4.63 1.17 2.40 3.91 4.79 5.49 6.30
IPO dummy 325,201 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1
Profitability 325,201 0.02 0.07 −0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
Tangibility 325,201 0.27 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.39 0.76
Investment 325,201 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06
R&D 325,201 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
R&D dummy 325,201 0.46 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Leverage 325,201 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.34 0.60
Volatility 325,201 0.29 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.37 0.64
Turnover 325,201 0.35 0.36 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.46 1.09
Institutional Ownership 325,201 0.40 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.37 0.65 0.89
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Table 1.2: Probability of SEO announcements: Bivariate sort on stock return and institu-
tional trading
The table reports quarterly SEO announcement probabilities. In each quarter, firms are sorted
independently into quintiles based on previous quarters raw stock return and different institutional
trading measures. Panel A reports the announcement probability for each return group, while
Panels B through I report the announcement probability for each return-institutional holding group.
Announcement probabilities are calculated as time-series averages of quarterly probabilities and
reported in percentage terms. My sample of potential SEO announcers consists of 356,482 firm-
quarter observations from 1985:Q1 to 2015:Q4.
Panel A: Univariate sort on stock return
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High
Mean Stock Return -0.302 -0.104 0.005 0.121 0.468
SEO announcement probability Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
All observations 0.527 0.696 0.839 1.230 2.629 2.102 (33.48)
Panel B: Bivariate sort on stock return and New holdings 1
New holdings 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.337 0.372 0.338 0.378 0.806 0.469 (5.95)
2 0.591 0.550 0.597 0.812 1.595 1.004 (7.35)
3 0.487 0.703 0.740 0.976 1.906 1.419 (10.33)
4 0.622 0.798 1.186 1.578 2.594 1.973 (13.11)
High 0.659 1.171 1.448 2.294 4.307 3.648 (20.73)
High minus Low 0.322 0.800 1.111 1.916 3.501 3.179
(4.39) (8.27) (10.29) (14.01) (19.05) (15.92)
(to be continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Panel C : Bivariate sort on stock return and Change in existing holdings 1
Change in existing holdings 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.502 0.705 0.980 1.711 3.173 2.671 (20.92)
2 0.505 0.607 0.832 1.087 2.697 2.192 (14.67)
3 0.442 0.523 0.626 0.943 1.615 1.172 (9.71)
4 0.503 0.566 0.650 1.002 1.764 1.261 (8.87)
High 0.728 1.042 1.120 1.483 3.224 2.496 (14.62)
High minus Low 0.226 0.337 0.140 -0.228 0.0508 -0.175
(2.68) (3.04) (1.09) (-1.50) (0.26) (-0.84)
Panel D: Bivariate sort on return and Increased holdings 1
Increased holdings 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.314 0.350 0.444 0.601 1.190 0.876 (9.97)
2 0.454 0.456 0.585 0.855 1.957 1.503 (11.15)
3 0.516 0.656 0.703 1.094 2.416 1.900 (12.17)
4 0.608 0.802 0.970 1.424 2.960 2.352 (14.43)
High 0.768 1.155 1.450 2.016 3.993 3.225 (19.75)
High minus Low 0.454 0.805 1.007 1.415 2.802 2.349
(6.08) (8.15) (8.52) (9.99) (16.09) (12.75)
Panel E: Bivariate sort on stock return and Institutional buying 1
Institutional buying 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.346 0.348 0.385 0.400 0.811 0.465 (5.57)
2 0.368 0.503 0.530 0.760 1.368 1.000 (8.64)
3 0.478 0.632 0.839 1.105 1.951 1.473 (10.54)
4 0.711 0.815 1.019 1.512 2.657 1.946 (12.95)
High 0.709 1.270 1.530 2.323 4.460 3.751 (21.91)
High minus Low 0.364 0.922 1.145 1.923 3.650 3.286
(4.75) (8.98) (9.78) (13.33) (18.97) (15.97)
(to be continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Panel F: Bivariate sort on return and Terminated holdings 1
Terminated holdings 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.318 0.461 0.505 0.703 1.442 1.124 (12.17)
2 0.613 0.650 0.673 0.903 2.224 1.612 (7.99)
3 0.491 0.711 0.979 1.197 2.472 1.981 (11.84)
4 0.582 0.808 0.932 1.588 3.176 2.594 (16.23)
High 0.665 0.833 1.221 1.928 3.876 3.211 (22.92)
High minus Low 0.347 0.372 0.717 1.225 2.434 2.087
(5.15) (4.34) (6.88) (9.54) (14.57) (12.55)
Panel G: Bivariate sort on return and Decreased holdings 1
Decreased holdings 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.395 0.506 0.512 0.635 1.411 1.015 (10.78)
2 0.610 0.630 0.874 1.035 2.342 1.732 (11.24)
3 0.512 0.701 0.831 1.230 2.602 2.089 (13.30)
4 0.497 0.812 0.813 1.333 2.868 2.371 (14.58)
High 0.642 0.809 1.168 1.729 3.585 2.943 (19.13)
High minus Low 0.246 0.303 0.656 1.094 2.174 1.928
(3.37) (3.34) (6.10) (8.50) (13.14) (10.88)
Panel H: Bivariate sort on stock return and Institutional selling 1
Institutional selling 1
Stock Return
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.414 0.503 0.536 0.604 1.181 0.767 (7.84)
2 0.431 0.608 0.687 0.910 2.085 1.654 (11.07)
3 0.566 0.654 0.800 1.248 2.513 1.947 (11.67)
4 0.584 0.794 0.970 1.410 3.029 2.445 (15.28)
High 0.603 0.890 1.361 2.121 3.893 3.290 (23.70)
High minus Low 0.189 0.387 0.826 1.518 2.712 2.523
(2.60) (4.05) (7.06) (10.77) (15.42) (14.18)
(to be continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Panel I: Bivariate sort on Institutional buying 1 and Institutional selling 1
Institutional buying 1
Institutional selling 1
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 0.361 0.480 0.649 0.529 0.527 0.167 (2.23)
2 0.686 0.590 0.673 0.706 0.928 0.242 (1.87)
3 0.695 1.100 0.989 1.032 0.847 0.152 (1.05)
4 1.063 1.575 1.553 1.311 1.310 0.247 (1.47)
High 1.175 2.014 2.429 2.671 2.698 1.523 (9.69)
High minus Low 0.814 1.534 1.780 2.141 2.170 1.356
(10.58) (11.26) (8.68) (9.02) (12.05) (7.52)
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Table 1.3: Probability of SEO announcements: Multivariate Analysis
The table reports marginal effects from multivariate Probit regressions of SEO announcements in
specification 1.11. The dependent variable is an SEO announcement. All specifications include
previous quarter’s institutional buying, institutional selling, and control variables. The interest
variables enter the model as dummies. High (medium) institutional buying is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one in quarter t if the respective institutional buying variable is
in its highest quintile (middle three quintiles) of quarter t, and High (medium) institutional
selling is set up in an identical fashion. All estimations include quarter and industry fixed effects
and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is indicated by * for
10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level.
(1) (2)
Share-based Count-based
High Inst. Buying 0.24∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.03)
Medium Inst. Buying 0.15∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.03)
High Inst. Selling 0.17∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03)
Medium Inst. Selling 0.15∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.02)
Stock Return 0.78∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.74∗∗∗ (0.03)
Lagged Stock Return 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.02)
Market to Book 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
Firm size −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01)
Firm age −0.13∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.13∗∗∗ (0.01)
IPO dummy 0.11∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.03)
Profitability −0.81∗∗∗ (0.13) −0.86∗∗∗ (0.13)
Tangibility 0.09 (0.05) 0.09∗ (0.05)
Investment 0.73∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.72∗∗∗ (0.11)
R&D 0.67∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.69∗∗∗ (0.14)
R&D dummy 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Leverage 0.56∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.04)
Volatility −0.67∗∗∗ (0.07) −0.66∗∗∗ (0.07)
Turnover 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02)
Institutional Ownership 0.25∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.04)
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.130
No. of Obs. 289727 289727
Quarter Fixed-effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effects Yes Yes
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Panel B: Average Adjusted Predictions of SEO announcements
Institutional Buying Institutional Selling
Low (0,0) 0.6734 0.7157
Medium (0,1) 0.9874 1.0507
High (1,0) 1.2579 1.1224
High minus Low 0.5845 0.4067
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Table 1.4: Probability of SEO announcements: Multivariate Analysis
The table reports marginal effects from multivariate Probit regressions of SEO announcements.
The dependent variable is an SEO announcement. All specifications include previous quarter’s
institutional buying, institutional selling, and control variables. All estimations include quarter and
industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance
is indicated by * for 10% level, ** for 5% level, and *** for 1% level.
(1) (2)
Share-based Count-based
Institutional Buying 0.05∗∗ (0.02) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.03)
Institutional Selling 0.31∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.05)
Stock Return 0.80∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.72∗∗∗ (0.03)
Lagged Stock Return 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.02)
M/B 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
Firm size −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01)
Firm age −0.14∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.13∗∗∗ (0.01)
IPO dummy 0.10∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03)
Profitability −0.78∗∗∗ (0.12) −0.85∗∗∗ (0.13)
Tangibility 0.08 (0.05) 0.09∗ (0.05)
Investment 0.75∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.72∗∗∗ (0.11)
R&D 0.71∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.14)
R&D dummy 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Leverage 0.54∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.04)
Volatility −0.74∗∗∗ (0.07) −0.67∗∗∗ (0.07)
Turnover 0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.02)
Institutional Ownership 0.29∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.04)
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.130
No. of Obs. 289727 289727
Quarter Fixed-effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effects Yes Yes
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Table 1.5: Probability of SEO announcements: Mutual Fund Hypothetical Outflow
The table reports quarterly SEO announcement probabilities. In each quarter, firms are sorted independently
into quintiles based on previous quarters raw stock return andMutual Fund Hypothetical Outflow (MFHO)
proposed by Edmans et al. (2012). Announcement probabilities are reported in each return-MFHO block and
calculated as time-series averages of quarterly probabilities and reported in percentage terms. Our sample
of potential SEO announcers consists of 163,405 firm-quarter observations from 1985:Q1 to 2015:Q4.
MFHO
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low 1.232 1.139 1.828 1.271 3.160 1.929 (6.10)
2 0.766 0.904 1.210 1.068 2.662 1.896 (6.48)
3 0.624 0.739 0.983 1.004 2.606 1.982 (6.49)
4 0.901 0.657 0.922 0.932 1.706 0.805 (2.78)
High 0.541 0.684 0.591 0.903 1.697 1.156 (3.98)
High minus Low −0.691 −0.454 −1.236 −0.368 −1.463 −0.772
(−2.75) (−2.14) (−5.46) (−1.65) (−4.14) (−1.72)
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Table 1.7: Probability of SEO announcements: Multivariate analysis with long-, mid- and
short-term institutional trading
The table reports multivariate analyses of SEO announcement probabilities. Panel A presents
marginal effects from multivariate Probit regression of SEO announcements. The dependent vari-
able is an SEO announcement. All specifications include previous quarter’s institutional buying,
institutional selling, and control variables. Long-/ mid-/ short-term institutional buying/selling is
measured by the aggregate number of stock i shares purchased/sold by long-/ mid- / short-term)
institutions in quarter t scaled by the aggregate number of stock i shares held by all institutions
at the beginning of quarter t in column (1). In column (2), long-/ mid-/ short-term institutional
buying/selling is measured by the aggregate number of long-/ mid- / short-term institutions who
purchased/sold stock i in quarter t scaled by the aggregate number of institutions stock i has at
the beginning of quarter t. High institutional buying/selling dummy variable takes the value of
one in quarter t if the respective institutional buying/selling variable falls in its top two quintiles
of quarter t. All estimations include quarter and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is indicated by * for 10% level, ** for 5% level,
and *** for 1% level.
(to be continued)
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Table 1.7 (continued)
Panel A: Probit regressions with quarter and industry fixed effects
(1) (2)
Share-based Count-based
High Long-term Inst. Buying −0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
High Mid-term Inst. Buying 0.04∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02)
High Short-term Inst. Buying 0.15∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.02)
High Long-term Inst. Selling −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02)
High Mid-term Inst. Selling 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
High Short-term Inst. Selling 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Stock Return 0.77∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.74∗∗∗ (0.03)
Lagged Stock Return 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.02)
Market to Book 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
Firm size −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01)
Firm age −0.12∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.11∗∗∗ (0.01)
IPO dummy 0.12∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.03)
Profitability −0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) −0.88∗∗∗ (0.15)
Tangibility 0.09∗ (0.06) 0.12∗∗ (0.06)
Investment 0.92∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.82∗∗∗ (0.15)
R&D 0.72∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.74∗∗∗ (0.16)
R&D dummy 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Leverage 0.61∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.60∗∗∗ (0.04)
Volatility −0.61∗∗∗ (0.08) −0.63∗∗∗ (0.08)
Turnover 0.05∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.03)
Institutional Ownership 0.22∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.04)
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.129
No. of Obs. 255690 257863
Quarter Fixed-effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-effects Yes Yes
(to be continued)
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Table 1.7 (continued)
Panel B: Average Adjusted Predictions of SEO probabilities (%)
Long-term Mid-term Short-term
Low Inst. Selling 1.1501 1.1034 1.0099
High Inst. Selling 1.0627 1.1287 1.2328
High - Low −0.0874 0.0253 0.2229
z-stat −2.05 0.57 4.73
P > z 0.040 0.567 0.000
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Table 1.8: SEO Announcement Raw Return (0,1)
The table reports SEO announcement Raw Return(0,1) sorted on stock return and institutional
trading. In each quarter, firms are sorted independently into quintiles based on previous quarters
raw stock return and different institutional trading measures.
Panel A: Bi-sort on stock return and Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -2.929 -2.365 -2.735 0.106 -2.538 0.390 (0.34)
2 -2.858 -1.945 -1.341 -3.107 -1.704 1.154 (1.05)
3 -1.923 -0.665 -1.544 -1.225 -1.307 0.615 (0.59)
4 -1.801 -2.295 -1.939 -2.186 -2.757 -0.956 (-1.25)
High -2.677 -1.626 -2.219 -2.721 -2.189 0.487 (0.62)
High minus low 0.252 0.739 0.516 -2.827 0.349 0.0968
(0.18) (0.70) (0.51) (-2.84) (0.50) (0.07)
Panel B: Bi-sort on stock return and short-term Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -1.470 -1.332 -2.979 -1.824 -1.828 -0.358 (-0.30)
2 -2.338 -3.088 -1.023 -2.114 -2.045 0.293 (0.25)
3 -4.128 -0.993 -1.930 -2.364 -2.202 1.926 (1.95)
4 -2.927 -2.057 -2.120 -1.587 -1.966 0.961 (1.22)
High -1.570 -1.323 -1.580 -2.392 -2.271 -0.701 (-0.88)
High minus low -0.100 0.00947 1.399 -0.568 -0.443 -0.342
(-0.07) (0.01) (1.37) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.23)
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Table 1.9: SEO Market-adjusted (Value-weighted) Announcement Return (0,1)
The table reports SEO Market-adjusted (Value-weighted) Announcement Return (0,1) sorted on
stock return and institutional trading. In each quarter, firms are sorted independently into quintiles
based on previous quarters raw stock return and different institutional trading measures.
Panel A: Bi-sort on stock return and Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -2.904 -2.647 -2.844 -0.311 -2.672 0.232 (0.22)
2 -2.697 -1.992 -1.625 -3.113 -1.761 0.937 (0.89)
3 -1.918 -0.762 -1.513 -1.501 -1.450 0.469 (0.48)
4 -1.719 -2.354 -1.879 -2.270 -2.826 -1.107 (-1.51)
High -2.746 -1.580 -2.204 -2.824 -2.251 0.496 (0.65)
High minus low 0.158 1.067 0.641 -2.513 0.421 0.264
(0.12) (1.02) (0.64) (-2.56) (0.63) (0.20)
Panel B: Bi-sort on stock return and short-term Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -1.749 -1.360 -3.070 -2.205 -1.930 -0.180 (-0.16)
2 -2.291 -3.025 -1.054 -2.236 -2.141 0.150 (0.13)
3 -3.689 -0.997 -1.917 -2.533 -2.324 1.365 (1.50)
4 -2.894 -2.187 -2.266 -1.675 -2.053 0.841 (1.11)
High -1.617 -1.480 -1.567 -2.549 -2.299 -0.682 (-0.89)
High minus low 0.133 -0.120 1.503 -0.344 -0.369 -0.502
(0.10) (-0.11) (1.53) (-0.47) (-0.58) (-0.35)
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Table 1.10: SEO Market-adjusted (Equal-weighted) Announcement Return (0,1)
The table reports SEO Market-adjusted (Equal-weighted) Announcement Return (0,1) sorted on
stock return and institutional trading. In each quarter, firms are sorted independently into quintiles
based on previous quarters raw stock return and different institutional trading measures.
Panel A: Bi-sort on stock return and Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -2.921 -2.669 -3.040 -0.389 -2.887 0.0338 (0.03)
2 -2.895 -2.266 -1.716 -3.174 -1.867 1.028 (0.98)
3 -2.024 -0.774 -1.655 -1.559 -1.604 0.420 (0.43)
4 -1.946 -2.438 -2.047 -2.333 -2.971 -1.025 (-1.41)
High -2.859 -1.770 -2.344 -2.950 -2.379 0.480 (0.64)
High minus low 0.0616 0.899 0.695 -2.562 0.508 0.447
(0.05) (0.85) (0.70) (-2.64) (0.76) (0.34)
Panel B: Bi-sort on stock return and short-term Institutional Selling 1
Return Quintile
Low 2 3 4 High High minus Low
Low -1.827 -1.456 -3.177 -2.271 -2.086 -0.258 (-0.23)
2 -2.382 -3.259 -1.206 -2.264 -2.263 0.119 (0.11)
3 -3.837 -1.193 -2.123 -2.574 -2.460 1.377 (1.51)
4 -3.001 -2.203 -2.342 -1.779 -2.184 0.817 (1.08)
High -1.830 -1.593 -1.740 -2.652 -2.472 -0.642 (-0.84)
High minus low -0.00241 -0.138 1.437 -0.381 -0.386 -0.384
(-0.00) (-0.13) (1.48) (-0.53) (-0.61) (-0.27)
Chapter 2
How Do Institutions Affect Capital
Structure?
2.1 Introduction
McCahery et al. (2016) surveyed institutional investors about engagement triggers. Three
factors are related to capital structure: ”large equity issuance”; ”suboptimal capital struc-
ture”; and ”low payments to shareholders despite high cash holdings.” On a 5-point scale, all
factors are scored statistically higher than 3 out 5, evidence that institutions would intervene
in capital structure decisions.
In this chapter, I empirically test whether institutions intervene with firm capital struc-
ture decisions directly. Prior research on institutions has been focused on how institutions
monitor and influence corporate investments and their effectiveness in doing so. Institutional
influence on corporate financing polices is less explored.
It is relevant to study institutions’ role in the financing decisions as the literature docu-
ments that institutions can improve the information environment (Utama and Cready (1997),
El-Gazzar (1998)) and reduce information asymmetry (Collins et al. (2003), Chakravarty
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(2001), Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Altı and Sulaeman (2012), Boone and White (2015)
).
The institutional governance literature details three channels through which institutions
affect firms: (1) direct intervention (”voice” in public (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirschman
(1970), Kahn and Winton (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000) or ”behind the scenes” (Carleton
et al. (1998), Becht et al. (2010), Dimson et al. (2015), McCahery et al. (2016)), (2) leaving
the firm (”exiting” or ”voting with their feet”)(Hirschman (1970), Admati and Pfleiderer
(2009), Parrino et al. (2003), Leuz et al. (2010)), or (3) the ”threat of exit” (Edmans (2009),
Edmans and Manso (2011), Bharath et al. (2013)).
Long-term institutions also have been shown to improve corporate governance and reduce
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Gillan and Starks (2000)).
I find that long-term institutions appear to induce firms to adhere to the pecking order of
financing, leading to a strong negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership
and the firm’s leverage ratio. Long-term institutional ownership is associated with more
internal financing and more debt than equity when external financing is needed. Although
the preference for debt over equity when using external financing should lead to higher
leverage, the preference for more internal financing dominates. Thus a negative relationship
between long-term institutional ownership and leverage is observed.
In contrast, short-term institutional ownership is associated with more reliance on ex-
ternal capital and more equity than debt. Since short-term institutions trade quite often
by definition, it is unlikely that they directly influence firm governance. Yet if a firm main-
tains a certain level of short-term institutional ownership, this implies a certain frequency
of short-term institutional trading. Combining this with the documented results in Chapter
1, which explains the high reliance on equity.
There is a tremendous amount of literature on pecking order. Myers and Majluf (1984)
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posit that firms would entirely consume internal finance before seeking external finance as
internal capital would be cheaper because of information asymmetry between managers and
investors. Thus when seeking external financing, debt is the primary choice because of its
relation to lower information costs and because equity will be issued only when debt financing
has been fully exploited. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) acknowledge strong support for
this prediction through testing whether the slope coefficient of one is observed regressing net
debt issues on the financing deficit.
Frank and Goyal (2003) extend the sample with regards to the time series and the cross-
section, and find several pieces of evidence, including extensively used external finance, equity
financing not dominated by debt financing, and net equity issues tracked by competent
financing deficit, all of which challenge the validity of the pecking order theory. Moreover,
they show a time trend of the increased use of equity and the declining support for the
pecking order theory, which is also reported in Fama and French (2005). Meanwhile, Frank
and Goyal (2003) conclude that large firms closely align to pecking order, whereas Fama and
French (2005) put forth that the pecking order actually describes the financing activity of
small firms more adequately.
Jung et al. (1996) argue that firms with higher information asymmetry would issue equity,
while also being able to issue debt, something that pecking order fails to explain. On the other
hand, Bharath et al. (2009) adopt a new measure of information asymmetry and conclude
that firms with lower information asymmetry are the ones failing to following pecking order.
Other factors, except for information asymmetry, also have been established to generate
similar pecking order behavior: transactions costs(Altınkılıc¸ and Hansen (2000)); corporate
taxes (Stiglitz (1973)); and incentive conflicts (Myers (2003), Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
Leary and Roberts (2010) compare these four different factors that simulate pecking order
behavior and find support for incentive conflicts.
Chirinko and Singha (2000) show that the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) method is
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not able to discriminate among optimal leverage ratio hypothesis nor can it accept the null
of pecking order when firms are following it but still end up using larger proportions of
equity. Lastly, the methodology does not indicate that equity is the bottom of the financial
hierarchy. The order of debt and equity is not tested in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999),
rather just the proportion.
In brief, there has been little agreement about pecking order. The results I find in this
chapter also may be a starting point from which to factor institutions into this study and
provide new potential methods on testing pecking order.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and reports the summary
statistics. Section 2.3 presents the strong negative relationship between long-term institu-
tional ownership and leverage. Section 2.4 shows that the negative relationship is not a
result of lower target leverage of long-term institutions. Section 2.5 decomposes the change
in leverage, and Section 2.6 tests the pecking order preference of long-term institutions.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data
I acquire firm-level data from the annual COMPUSTAT database and the monthly equity
CRSP stock return database. Following the literature, firm in the financial sector (SIC codes
6000-6999) and in the utility sector (SIC codes 4900-4999) are not included in the sample
because their capital structures are likely to be significantly different from those of firms in
other sectors. The balance sheet and cash flow statement variables as a percentage of total
assets or sales are trimmed to remove the most extreme 1% in either tail of the distribution if
the variable can be negative, or in the right tail only if the variable is positive by definition.
Only ordinary common shares, share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP, are kept in the sample.
The Thomson Financial 13F Institutional Holdings database is merged with the annual
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COMPUSTAT database to access institutional ownership data. As Thomson provides the
institutions’ holdings on a quarterly base, the firm’s fiscal-year-end quarter in COMPUSTAT
is used to merge with the latest institutional holdings data available before the fiscal end
month; for example, if the firm fiscal end month is March, April, or May, it will match to
the institution’s first quarter report. Following this pattern going forward for firms’ fiscal
end months, June, July, and August will match to the second quarter report of institutions;
September, October, and November will match to the third quarter; December will match
to the same year’s fourth quarter holdings report; and January and February will match to
the previous years fourth quarter holdings data for institutions.
This is necessary to minimize the reporting lag between firms and institutions, while
being able to validate that institutions were holding the firm for, at the very least, part of
the fiscal year. For robustness, I also attempt to match the institutional holdings data to the
same quarter with the fiscal end quarter or to match the institutional holdings data using
the fourth quarter only. Neither affects my results qualitatively.
Because Thomson Financial 13F Institutional Holdings database only keeps records from
1980 and onwards, the final sample is limited to the 1980-2014 period. Only firms who have
at one point been held by an institutional investor are retained in the sample. Summary
statistics are reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. As documented in the literature, such as by
Aghion et al. (2013), there is a highly noticeable, increasing institutional ownership trend,
while book leverage is rather stable over time.
2.3 Determinants of Leverage
In this section, I present the strong negative relationship between institutional ownership
and leverage, while controlling for size, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunity, research
and development (R&D), sales expense, tangibility, depreciation, and one-year stock return,
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which have been shown to be important determinants of leverage. (Rajan and Zingales
(1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Fama and French (2002),
among others) Table 2.3 reports the results for the following model:
Leveragei,t+1 = α + κTotalIOi,t +Xi,tβ + i,t+1. (2.1)
The literature has used various econometric methods for equation 2.1 for different consider-
ations: column (1) uses ordinary least squares (OLS); column (2) estimates the model in a
panel with firm fixed effects; column (3) presents Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates; and
column (4) presents Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates with all the variables demeaned;
that is, all variables are defined as the differences from three-digit SIC industry means for
a given year. As presented in Table 2.2, there is a vivid, increasing trend in institutional
ownership over time. Although book leverage is quite stable, on average, one might doubt
that this time trend drives the negative relationship. Columns (3) and (4), however, should
eliminate this concern.
The coefficient estimates in all four columns of all the control variables are consistent
with what the literature has documented. And institutional ownership is negative when
related to leverage no matter which econometrics estimation procedure is adopted.
I then divide the total institutional ownership in equation 2.1 into long-term, mid-term,
and short-term following Yan and Zhang (2009) and based on their average portfolio turnover
in the last four quarters. This part is calculated first in the 13F database before merging
with the annual COMPUSTAT to cooperate with the calculation method that is based on
quarterly data. Specifically, I first calculate the aggregate purchases and sales for each
institution k during each quarter t:
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CR buyk,t =
Nk∑
i−1
Sk,i,t>Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|, (2.2)
CR sellk,t =
Nk∑
i−1
Sk,i,t≤Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|. (2.3)
Here, Pi,t−1 and Pi,t are the share prices for stock i at the end of quarters t − 1 and t,
respectively. ∆Pi,t is Pi,t − Pi,t−1. Sk,i,t−1 and Sk,i,t are institution k’s holdings of stock i at
the end of quarters t− 1 and t, respectively. CR buyk,t and CR sellk,t denote institution k’s
aggregate purchases and sales in quarter t. The churn rate of institution k in quarter t is
then defined as
CRk,t ≡
min(CR buyk,t, CR sellk,t)
Nk∑
i=1
Sk,i,tPi,t+Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1
2
. (2.4)
I then calculate each institution’s average churn rate over the past four quarters as
AV G CRk,t =
1
4
3∑
m=0
CRk,t−m. (2.5)
Next, for each quarter, all institutions are sorted into three tertile portfolios based on
AV G CRk,t. The institutions ranked in the top tertile have the highest turnover and are
classified as short-term institutional investors, whereas those ranked in the bottom tertile
have the lowest turnover and are classified as long-term institutional investors.
After decomposing the total institutional ownership in equation 2.1 into long-term, mid-
term, and short-term, I estimate the following model:
Leveragei,t+1 = α+κ1Long-termIOi,t+κ2Mid-termIOi,t++κ3Short-termIOi,t+Xi,tβ+i,t+1.
(2.6)
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Table 2.4 reports the estimation results of equation 2.6. Long-term institutional owner-
ship develops negatively related to leverage in all columns, whereas short-term institutional
ownership remains only negative when estimated in panel with firm fixed effects. In addition,
when using Fama-MacBeth, the coefficients are positively significant.
The negative coefficient in column (2) for short-term institutional ownership may be a
result of the increasing time trend of institutional ownership and stable leverage over time in
Table 2.2. When focusing on the year by year cross-sectional relationship in columns (3) and
(4), short-term institutional ownership is positively related to leverage. It is plausible that
short-term institutions do not actually attempt to affect firm’s capital structure. They may
just trade instead. The changing coefficient may be the result of them trading on information
related to future investment opportunists, which can lead to more financing demand. Firms
may finance differently for the demand: internal, debt, or equity. Different choices would
lead to different directions of changes in leverage and thus the different estimation results.
Long-term and short-term institutions have been established by the literature to behave
strategically different. The evidence presented thus far showcases this variable behavior,
which is present in relation to the firm’s capital structure as well. Throughout this chapter,
while still controlling for short-term institutional ownership in all my analysis, my principal
discussion is to explain the negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership
and leverage.
The negative relationship between institutional ownership and leverage is the combined
effect of long-, mid-, and short-term institutional ownership. As long-term and short-term
institutional ownership have different effects on leverage, it is also necessary and essential,
from this perspective, to focus on the long-term institutional ownership instead of total
institutional ownership. However, for analysis and discussion, I report total institutional
ownership, which can provide additional insight into which scenarios long-term institutional
ownership predominates.
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2.4 Institutions and leverage targets
The negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership and leverage might be
interpreted as evidence that long-term institutions prefer lower targets in the spirit of the
trade-off theory. In the trade-off story, the preferences of short-term institutions are still
not clear, which is evidenced by the mixed results that have been reported in the previous
section. In this section, I study whether long-term institutions have lower targets and what
preferences if any, short-term institutions have for leverage.
2.4.1 Debt-Equity Choice
The previous section suggests that long-term institutional ownership tends to reduce the
firm leverage ratio, but these results do not indicate whether institutional preferences affect
firm financing choices when firms raise new funds or retire/repurchase existing capital. To
study institutions’ role in firm financing choices, I employ the following models:
Debti,t+1 = α + ψTotalIOi,t +Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1, (2.7)
Debti,t+1 =α + ψ1Long-termIOi,t + ψ2Mid-termIOi,t + ψ3Short-termIOi,t
+Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1.
(2.8)
This is a logit regression that predicts a firm’s financing choice between debt and equity
in a given year. Following other studies, such as Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian
(2006), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), and Leary and Roberts (2010), Debti,t+1 is identified as
the relative changes in debt and equity above a given size threshold.
I estimate two versions of this model: one for raising new capital and one for retiring
existing capital. In detail, a debt issuance (reduction) is defined as a net increase (decrease)
in total book debt from year t − 1 to t, in excess of 5% of total assets in year t; an equity
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issuance (repurchase) is defined as the sale of common and preferred stock, net of repurchases
during year t normalized by total assets in year t larger than 5% (smaller than -5%). Debti,t+1
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm issues (retires) debt and 0 when a firm issues
(retires) equity.
If institutions prefer lower targets, they would favor issuing new equity over debt in the
issuance regression and would favor reducing debt over repurchasing equity in the reduc-
tion/repurchase regression.
Table 2.5 reports the estimation results. Total institutional ownership has no effect on
issuance choice between debt and equity, while leading to more equity reduction than debt
and resulting in higher leverage. Long- and mid-term institutional ownership leads to more
significant debt issue than equity issue and more significant equity repurchase than debt
reduction, resulting in higher leverage. Short-term institutional ownership has no effect on
retiring choice between debt and equity, but leads to more equity issuance than debt and
results in lower leverage.
This presents a contradiction to the previous section. In the determinants model, total,
long-, and mid-term institutions are negatively related to leverage, but are positively related
to leverage in the debt-equity choice model.
However, there is a nontrivial difference between the debt-equity choice model and the
determinants model: the debt-equity choice model solely examines when firms raise or retire
significant external financing. It leaves out the times when firms make no significant external
financing changes, which is more than half of the time in my sample. During these times,
firms may take internal financing actions that can also affect leverage ratios, and excluding
them could be a drawback of using the debt-equity choice model in this particular analysis.
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2.4.2 Multinomial Logit Regression comparing Significant Exter-
nal Financing Actions to None
To address the concern with traditional debt-equity choice model, I adopt the following
multinomial logit models:
Fini,t+1 = α + ψTotalIOi,t +Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1, (2.9)
Fini,t+1 =α + ψ1Long-termIOi,t + ψ2Mid-termIOi,t + ψ3Short-termIOi,t
+Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1.
(2.10)
Fini,t+1 is defined the same as Debti,t+1 in the previous section. In addition to eq-
uity/debt issuance or reduction, Fini,t+1 has a third value that refers to situations in which
no significant changes of equity or debt happens. This is also the base scenario in all esti-
mations. Similarly, I estimate two versions for each specification: one for raising new capital
and one for retiring existing capital.
Table 2.6 reports estimation results. Panel A reports both versions of specification 2.9.
Total institutional ownership does not lead to more issuance of either debt or equity, but it
is related to more equity reduction and less debt reduction, meaning a higher leverage ratio.
Panel B reports both versions of specification 2.10. Long-term institutional ownership
is associated with less issuance of both equity and debt, more reduction of equity, and no
effect on debt reduction. Mid-term institutional ownership is associated with less issuance
of equity, more reduction of equity, and no effect on debt issuance or reduction. Short-term
institutional ownership is associated with more issuance of both equity and debt and less
reduction of both equity and debt. The effect of mid-term institutional ownership on the
leverage ratio is positive, yet the effect of long- and short-term institutional ownership on
the leverage ratio depends on the size of the issuance and reduction.
A multinomial logit regression also presents a rather unclear picture about the relation-
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ship between institutional ownership and leverage.
2.4.3 Partial Adjustment: Speed of Adjustment
In this section, I attempt to analyze the relationship between institutional ownership and
leverage from a different perspective. Assuming institutions do follow the trade-off theory,
in the sense that they have a leverage target, I test whether institutions accelerate firms’
speed of adjustment. To calculate the speed of adjustment, I adopt the partial adjustment
model.
I divide firms into two groups based on their institutional ownership level and estimate
equations 2.11 and 2.12 and report the results in Table 2.7.
Leveragei,t =αTotalIOi,t−1 +Xi,t−1β + (1− λ1)Leveragei,t−1
+ (1− λ2)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighTotalIO + δi,t,
(2.11)
Leveragei,t =α + κ1Long-termIOi,t + +κ2Mid-termIOi,t + +κ3Short-termIOi,t
+ (1− λ2)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighLong-termIO
+ (1− λ3)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighMid-termIO
+ (1− λ4)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighShort-termIO
+Xi,t−1β + (1− λ1)Leveragei,t−1 + δi,t.
(2.12)
In equation 2.11, the speed of adjustment is λ1 for the firms with low total institutional
ownership and λ1 + λ2 for the firms with high total institutional ownership. Similarly, in
equation 2.12, the speed of adjustment is λ1 for the firms with low long-, mid-, and short-
term institutional ownership, and add λ2/λ3/λ4, respectively, to λ1 for the firms with high
long-, mid-, and short-term institutional ownership.
The results in Table 2.7 are estimated using OLS, but are qualitatively similar using the
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panel data with firm fixed effects or the Fama-Macbeth method. In column (1), the speed
for firms with low total institutional ownership is 0.132, which means it takes these firms, on
average, more than 7 years to reach their target. While for firms with high total institutional
ownership, the speed is 0.113, which means close to 9 years for firms to reach targets. So
high total institutional ownership actually has a negative effect on the speed of adjustment.
In column (2), high mid- and short-term institutional ownership have a negative effect on
the speed of adjustment too, whereas long-term institutional ownership does not affect it.
Another result is noticeable in the partial adjustment model results: total, long-, and
mid-term institutional ownership is still negatively related to leverage. This result is the
same as that in the determinants model.
Since high institutional ownership has a negative or no effect on firms’ speed to get to
their target, combined with the other results presented in Section 2.4, it is plausible that
institutions do not set a lower target. Instead, there may be something else driving this. The
debt-equity choice model and the multinomial logit model are focused on debt and equity
changes and ignore another critical part in capital structure: changes in retained earnings.
2.5 Components of Change in Leverage
Baker and Wurgler (2002) decomposed the change in leverage into: net equity issues (et),
changes in retained earnings (∆REt), and growth in assets. Based on their decomposition, I
further decompose growth in assets into net debt issue (∆Dt) and residual change in leverage.
All three components are scaled by total assets of period t:
∆Di,t = α + κDTotalIOi,t−1 +Xi,t−1βD + λDLeveragei,t−1 + σi,t, (2.13)
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∆Di,t =α + κD1Long-termIOi,t−1 + κD2Mid-termIOi,t−1 + κD3Short-termIOi,t−1
+Xi,t−1βD + λDLeveragei,t−1 + σi,t,
(2.14)
ei,t = α + κeTotalIOi,t−1 +Xi,t−1βe + λeLeveragei,t−1 + σi,t, (2.15)
ei,t =α + κe1Long-termIOi,t−1 + κe2Mid-termIOi,t−1 + κe3Short-termIOi,t−1
+Xi,t−1βe + λeLeveragei,t−1 + σi,t,
(2.16)
∆REi,t = α + κRETotalIOi,t−1 +Xi,t−1βRE + λRELeveragei,t−1 + σi,t, (2.17)
∆REi,t =α + κRE1Long-termIOi,t−1 + κRE2Mid-termIOi,t−1 + κRE3Short-termIOi,t−1
+Xi,t−1βRE + λRELeveragei,t−1 + σi,t.
(2.18)
In Table 2.8, I regress each of these three components of changes in leverage on insti-
tutional ownership and other independent variables. In column (2), long-term (short-term)
institutional ownership has a negative (positive) effect on net debt issues (∆Dt), which adds
up to the nonsignificant effect of total institutional ownership on net debt issues (∆Dt) in col-
umn (1). This, again, calls for the necessity of decomposing institutional ownership because
of its different attributes documented in the literature. Column (4) shows that long-term
(short-term) institutional ownership also has a negative (positive) effect on net equity issue
(et). In columns (5) and (6), all institutional ownership is positively related to changes in
retained earnings (∆REt).
The negative coefficient of long-term institutional ownership on net debt issues (∆Dt)
appears to contradict what is reported in Table 2.5, where firms issue more debt than equity
and are less likely to reduce debt compared with equity. This is not the case. Table 2.5
only looks at circumstances in which firms already need external finance and compares debt
to equity relatively, whereas Table 2.8 studies the absolute change. This also explains why
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short-term institutional ownership is associated with more equity issue compared with debt,
but still has a positive effect on debt in the debt-equity choice model.
Changes in retained earnings (∆REt) is the missing piece in the long-term institutional
ownership and leverage puzzle presented in the previous sections. The increase in changes in
retained earnings (∆REt) and the decrease in net debt issues (∆Dt) both indicate a negative
change in leverage, and they predominate the positive effect of decrease in net equity issue
(et) and thus the negative effect on leverage.
There are four scenarios with possible relevance to this case. First, assuming a firm’s
financing need is constant, if firms use more retained earnings, their financing deficit would
be smaller. Thus the sum of debt and equity issued would decrease. Second, if firms’
financing needs decrease, and their changes in retained earnings (∆REt) increase, their sum
of debt and equity issued would still decrease. Third, if firms’ financing needs increase, and
they use more internal capital to satisfy the extra financing need, they will still experience
continual decreases in external finance. Fourth, if firms’ financing needs increases, they can
use more internal capital, while simultaneously using more external capital. In this case,
whether internal capital is proportionally used remains unclear.
Based on the evidence within this section, it is probable that long-term institutional
ownership is associated with one of the first three scenarios, whereas short-term institutional
ownership is related to the fourth scenario.
2.6 Pecking order test
2.6.1 Financing Deficit
Decomposing change in leverage and the debt-equity choice implicitly indicates that long-
term institutions prefer and govern firms, following the pecking order test. In this section,
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I directly test this hypothesis. A strict pecking order behavior would not allow for any
savings, and therefore the hypothesis here is closer to the concept of ”modified pecking
order” in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).
The literature calculates the financing deficit as follows:
DEFt = DIVt + It + ∆Wt − CFt = ∆Dt + et, (2.19)
where DEFt is the financing deficit in year t, DIVt is the cash dividends in year t, It is the
net investment in year t, ∆Wt is the change in working capital in year t, CFt is the cash
flow after interest and taxes, ∆Dt is the net debt issue in year t, and et is the net equity
issue in year t defined like in previous sections. All variables are scaled by total assets at
the end of year t. I include the change in current debt as part of the net debt issue ∆Dt,
so that it is directly comparable to the net debt issue in previous sections. This choice is
bias against the pecking order. Nevertheless, for the purpose of a robustness check, I also
excluded the change in current debt following Frank and Goyal (2003), and my conclusions
are not affected.
The empirical specification is as follows:
∆Di,t = α + βPODEFi,t + λDEFi,t ∗HighTotalIOi,t + θHighTotalIOi,t + ζi, t, (2.20)
∆Di,t =α + βPODEFi,t
+ λ1DEFi,t ∗HighLIOi,t + λ2DEFi,t ∗HighMIOi,t + λ3DEFi,t ∗HighSIOi,t
+ θ1HighLIOi,t + θ2HighMIOi,t + θ3HighSIOi,t + ζi, t,
(2.21)
whereHighTotalIOi,t, HighLIOi,t, HighMIOi,t, andHighSIOi,t are dummy variables equal
to 1 when firm i’s respective ownership is higher than the median of year t, and otherwise 0.
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Based on my hypothesis, which is that long-term institutions incentivize firms to adhere
more closely to the pecking order, I expect to see λ1 > 0. The estimation results are in
column (3) in Table 2.9. λ1 is estimated as 0.236, is statistically positive, and its economic
significance is nontrivial. Compared with base firms that finance 39.9% of their deficit with
debt, a 23.6% difference is more than half. The positive effect of long-term institutional
ownership dominates the negative effect of short-term institutional ownership, which results
in a positive λ in high total institutional ownership in column (2).
Institutional ownership has a high correlation with size, and size has been shown in Frank
and Goyal (2003) to be positively related to pecking order behavior. So to ensure that my
observations are not driven by the positive correlation between institutional ownership and
size, I estimate the following model:
∆Di,t =α + βPODEFi,t
+ λDEFi,t ∗HighTotalIOi,t + θHighTotalIOi,t
+ γDEF i,t ∗ Sizei,t + φSizei,t + υi,t,
(2.22)
∆Di,t =α + βPODEFi,t
+ λ1DEFi,t ∗HighLIOi,t + λ2DEFi,t ∗HighMIOi,t + λ3DEFi,t ∗HighSIOi,t
+ θ1HighLIOi,t + θ2HighMIOi,t + θ3HighSIOi,t
+ γDEF i,t ∗ Sizei,t + φSizei,t + υi,t.
(2.23)
Table 2.10 reports the estimation results. The magnitude of λ1 is even larger now: a 69.9%
increase compared with that of the base firms. For a robustness check, I also estimate the
model with size quintile dummies instead. Doing so does not alter my results qualitatively.
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2.6.2 Financing Demand
To test whether firms use more internal capital under the influence of institutional investors,
I consider not only the deficit amount but also how much internal financing accounts for the
financing demand. Thus, I rewrite equation 2.19 as
FinD
(CF−DIV )
t = It + ∆Wt = ∆Dt + et + (CFt −DIVt), (2.24)
where (CFt −DIVt) is the internal financing component.
For the aggregated form of accounting cash flow identity purpose, equation 2.24 is the
appropriate form to examine internal capital’s role. From a basic financing point of view,
financing demand should be equal to financing supply, and financing supply only comes from
retained earnings and debt and equity issue, so the equation should be as follows:
FinDREt = ∆Dt + et + ∆REt, (2.25)
where ∆REt is the internal financing component. It is difficult and unnecessary to simply
declare one approach is superior over another. For the purpose of this paper, changes in
retained earnings, ∆REt, is directly related to other sections of discussion. I will focus
my discussion on the FinDREt definition, but I will report results for FinD
(CF−DIV )
t as a
robustness check. To test whether institutions prefer internal capital, the model is as follows:
∆REi,t = α + βFinD
RE
i,t + λFinD
RE
i,t ∗HighTotalIO + θHighTotalIOi,t + τi,t, (2.26)
∆REi,t =α + βFinD
RE
i,t + λ1FinD
RE
i,t ∗HighLIOi,t
+ λ2FinD
RE
i,t ∗HighMIOi,t + λ3FinDREi,t ∗HighSIOi,t
+ θ1HighLIOi,t + θ2HighMIOi,t + θ3HighSIOi,t + τi,t,
(2.27)
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or
(CF−DIV )i,t = α+βFinD(CF−DIV )i,t +λFinD(CF−DIV )i,t ∗HighTotalIO+θHighTotalIOi,t+τi,t,
(2.28)
(CF −DIV )i,t =α + βFinD(CF−DIV )i,t + λ1FinD(CF−DIV )i,t ∗HighLIOi,t
+ λ2FinD
(CF−DIV )
i,t ∗HighMIOi,t + λ3FinD(CF−DIV )i,t ∗HighSIOi,t
+ θ1HighLIOi,t + θ2HighMIOi,t + θ3HighSIOi,t + τi,t.
(2.29)
The estimation results are reported in Panels A and B in Table 2.11. For the FinDRE
measure, λ1 is statistically significantly positive with a coefficient of 0.031 compared with
0.560, which is a 5.5% increase. When using the FinD(CF−DIV ) measure, λ1 is only marginally
significant, and the economic significance is smaller: 0.016 compared with 0.421, a 3.8% in-
crease.
Controlling for firm size, the regression results for ∆REi,t/(CF−DIV )i,t on FinDREi,t /FinD(CF−DIV )i,t
are reported in Table 2.12. Long-term institutional ownership still leads to more internal
finance no matter which approach used. The magnitude increases for both: high long-term
institutional ownership leads to a 7.6% increased use of ∆REi,t and a 12.3% increased use
of (CF −DIV )i,t compared with the base model.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter documents a strong negative relationship observed for institutional ownership,
specifically long-term institutional ownership and leverage. I show that this is not a reflec-
tion of long-term institutions targeting lower leverage in the context of the trade-off theory
of capital structure. Instead, this is a result of long-term institutions’ apparent preference
for the pecking order of financing. Consequently, firms with higher long-term institutional
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ownership have a higher fraction of internal versus external financing. Under the circum-
stance in which external capital needs to be raised, such firms show preferences for debt over
equity.
The relationship between short-term institutional ownership is rather mixed. Short-term
institutions trade often and do not stay with one firm for long, so there may be no motivation,
or possibility for them, to interfere with firms’ financing policies.
I have not addressed why long-term institutional ownership would prefer the pecking
order in this chapter, but since institutional ownership has been shown to be extensively
negatively related to information asymmetry, I conjecture that the reason lies with the
incentive conflicts in the spirit of Jensen et al. (1986), which generates the pecking order
behavior as illustrated by Myers (2003). These questions can be addressed in future research.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics. Institutional Ownership is fraction of
shares outstanding owned by institutional investors in Thomson Financial 13F. Long-, Mid- and
Short Institutional Ownership are defined in detail in the context. Book Leverage is book debt
divided by total assets. Market-to-book is market equity plus book debt divided by total assets.
Firm age is the number of years since the first appearance in Compustat. Profitability is annual
operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Tangibility is quarterly total (net)
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. R&D is quarterly research and development
expenditures divided by total assets. R&D dummy is equal to zero if R&D is missing.
count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Total IO 125, 988 0.339 0.000 0.076 0.279 0.568 0.860
Long-term IO 125, 988 0.093 0.000 0.015 0.064 0.141 0.283
Mid-term IO 125, 988 0.154 0.000 0.015 0.105 0.251 0.466
Short-term IO 125, 988 0.107 0.000 0.009 0.074 0.168 0.337
Book Leverage 125, 988 0.225 0.000 0.038 0.192 0.352 0.615
Profitability 119, 890 0.112 −0.223 0.049 0.129 0.205 0.360
M/B 124, 733 1.849 0.763 1.045 1.397 2.117 4.614
Tangibility 125, 849 0.281 0.029 0.104 0.222 0.400 0.751
Total Assets 125, 988 1649.111 6.069 32.322 124.533 581.242 5795.043
One-year Stock Return 112, 776 0.122 −0.623 −0.246 0.043 0.368 1.193
R&D 123, 718 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.255
R&D dummy 125, 988 0.640 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Depreciation/Total Assets 120, 929 0.052 0.013 0.029 0.045 0.065 0.118
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: institutional ownership over time
Fiscal Year Total IO Long-term IO Mid-term IO Short-term IO Book Leverage
1980 0.136 0.023 0.041 0.039 0.257
1981 0.140 0.034 0.053 0.053 0.247
1982 0.153 0.034 0.060 0.060 0.256
1983 0.176 0.038 0.064 0.074 0.237
1984 0.182 0.048 0.066 0.068 0.248
1985 0.205 0.051 0.084 0.070 0.255
1986 0.214 0.065 0.075 0.074 0.262
1987 0.214 0.064 0.079 0.071 0.267
1988 0.224 0.080 0.079 0.065 0.269
1989 0.233 0.082 0.079 0.072 0.273
1990 0.243 0.088 0.081 0.075 0.268
1991 0.264 0.084 0.089 0.091 0.243
1992 0.282 0.072 0.106 0.106 0.225
1993 0.282 0.086 0.093 0.104 0.214
1994 0.299 0.080 0.111 0.108 0.219
1995 0.313 0.078 0.121 0.115 0.219
1996 0.307 0.068 0.132 0.109 0.212
1997 0.327 0.068 0.138 0.124 0.223
1998 0.343 0.073 0.160 0.113 0.238
1999 0.339 0.062 0.164 0.120 0.230
2000 0.347 0.060 0.184 0.108 0.217
2001 0.386 0.106 0.172 0.113 0.215
2002 0.419 0.099 0.220 0.110 0.206
2003 0.448 0.089 0.241 0.134 0.193
2004 0.495 0.118 0.265 0.149 0.180
2005 0.504 0.146 0.264 0.150 0.179
2006 0.509 0.151 0.285 0.163 0.185
2007 0.500 0.149 0.300 0.181 0.192
2008 0.526 0.185 0.267 0.140 0.213
2009 0.536 0.164 0.286 0.139 0.191
2010 0.545 0.189 0.266 0.140 0.182
2011 0.559 0.198 0.282 0.126 0.192
2012 0.565 0.209 0.264 0.131 0.199
2013 0.554 0.158 0.248 0.162 0.210
2014 0.528 0.160 0.232 0.145 0.232
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Book Leverage: lagged model with total IO
Regression results of specification 2.1: Leveragei,t+1 = αTotalIOi,t + Xi,tβ + i,t+1. All variables
are defined in detail in the appendix. Column (1) reports the estimations results of OLS, column
(2) estimates the model in panel with firm fixed effect, column (3) and (4) estimate with Fama-
Macbeth, and all variables are defined as differences from three-digit SIC industry means for a
given year in column (4). Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in Column (1) and (2). Asterisks ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Firm FE Panel Fama-Macbeth Fama-Macbeth Demeaned
Institutional −0.087∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
Ownership (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013)
Log of Sales/CPI 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
M/B −0.010∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.186∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
R&D/Sales −0.165∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025)
R&D dummy −0.043∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Expense/Sales −0.060∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
Profitability −0.221∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Depreciation/Total 0.156∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
Assets (0.056) (0.047) (0.052) (0.062)
One-year Stock −0.008∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.006∗∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.159 0.129 0.181 0.109
No. of Obs. 92717 92717 92717 92717
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Book Leverage: lagged model with long-, mid- and short-term
Institutional Ownership
Regression results of specification 2.6: Leveragei,t+1 = α1Long-termIOi,t + α2Mid-termIOi,t +
α3Short-termIOi,t +Xi,tβ+ i,t+1. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. Column (1)
reports the estimations results of OLS, column (2) estimates the model in panel with firm fixed
effect, column (3) and (4) estimate with Fama-Macbeth, and all variables are defined as differences
from three-digit SIC industry means for a given year in column (4). Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in
Column (1) and (2). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Firm FE Panel Fama-Macbeth Fama-Macbeth Demeaned
Long-term −0.157∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017)
Mid-term −0.092∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020)
Short-term 0.018 −0.040∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
Institutional Ownership (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Log of Sales/CPI 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
M/B −0.011∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.186∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
R&D/Sales −0.175∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025)
R&D dummy −0.043∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Expense/Sales −0.060∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Profitability −0.229∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014)
Depreciation/Total 0.127∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
Assets (0.056) (0.047) (0.049) (0.059)
One-year Stock −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.160 0.126 0.186 0.115
No. of Obs. 92717 92717 92717 92717
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Table 2.5: Debt-Equity Choice
Column (1) and (3) report the Logit regression results of specification 2.7: Debti,t+1 = α +
ψTotalIOi,t+Xi,tβ+λLeveragei,t+ηi,t+1 and column (2) and (4) report the Logit regression results
of specification 2.8: Debti,t+1 = α+ψ1Long-termIOi,t +ψ2Mid-termIOi,t +ψ3Short-termIOi,t +
Xi,tβ+λLeveragei,t+ηi,t+1. Firms are defined as issuing(retiring) a security when the net amount
issued(retired) from year t− 1 to t divided by total assets in year t exceeds 5%. Cases where firms
issued (retired) both debt and equity in a given fiscal year are omitted. Debti,t+1 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 when firm issues(retires) debt and 0 when firm issues(retires) equity. All inde-
pendent variables are defined in detail in the appendix. All columns are estimated with year and
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(to be continued)
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Table 2.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt(1) vs. Equity(0) Issue Debt(1) vs. Equity(0) Reduction
Total IO −0.012 −0.742∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.130)
Long-term IO 1.167∗∗∗ −1.821∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.362)
Mid-term IO 1.200∗∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.236)
Short-term IO −1.529∗∗∗ −0.215
(0.187) (0.287)
Firm Size(Log of 0.196∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗
Sales/CPI) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023)
M/B −0.335∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (0.037)
Tangibility 0.648∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.000∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.133) (0.253) (0.255)
R&D −2.672∗∗∗ −2.685∗∗∗ −0.415 −0.389
(0.373) (0.375) (0.570) (0.570)
R&D dummy −0.021 −0.035 −0.005 −0.011
(0.050) (0.050) (0.076) (0.076)
Expense/Sales −0.252∗ −0.248∗ −1.638∗∗∗ −1.623∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.239) (0.239)
Profitability 1.857∗∗∗ 1.875∗∗∗ −6.096∗∗∗ −6.068∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.157) (0.308) (0.309)
Depreciation/Total −4.262∗∗∗ −3.876∗∗∗ 15.832∗∗∗ 15.681∗∗∗
Assets (0.702) (0.701) (1.561) (1.568)
One-year Stock −0.259∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗ ∗
Return (0.033) (0.033) (0.054) (0.055)
Book Leverage −1.530∗∗∗ −1.506∗∗∗ 9.065∗∗∗ 9.067∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.314) (0.313)
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.192 0.465 0.467
No. of Obs. 22611 22611 17900 17900
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6: Multinomial Logit Comparison of Debt/Equity to No Issuance/Reduction
Panel A reports the Multinomial Logit regression results of specification 2.9: Fini,t+1 = α +
ψTotalIOi,t + Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1 and Panel B reports the Multinomial Logit re-
gression results of specification 2.10: Fini,t+1 = α + ψ1Long-termIOi,t + ψ2Mid-termIOi,t +
ψ3Short-termIOi,t + Xi,tβ + λLeveragei,t + ηi,t+1. The base situation is when firms have no is-
suance or reduction actions. Column (1)/(2)/(3)/(4) in both Panels respectively compare equity
issuance /debt issuance /equity reduction /debt reduction to no actions. Column (1) and (2) are
results of the same Multinomial Logit regression, (3) and (4) are of another. Firms are defined as
issuing(retiring) a security when the net amount issued(retired) from year t−1 to t divided by total
assets in year t exceeds 5%. Cases where firms issued (retired) both debt and equity in a given
fiscal year are omitted. All independent variables are defined in detail in the appendix. All columns
are estimated with year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(to be continued)
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Panel A: Multinomial Logit on Total Institutional Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity Issue Debt Issue Equity Reduction Debt Reduction
Total IO −0.073 0.057 0.628∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.052) (0.086) (0.060)
Firm Size(Log of −0.236∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
Sales/CPI) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009)
M/B 0.312∗∗∗ 0.027 ∗ ∗ −0.002 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017)
Tangibility −0.269 ∗ ∗ 0.370∗∗∗ −0.211 −1.009∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.075) (0.177) (0.083)
R&D 0.488 ∗ ∗ −1.883∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.250∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.275) (0.362) (0.235)
R&D dummy −0.116 ∗ ∗ −0.148∗∗∗ 0.078 0.056∗
(0.047) (0.026) (0.057) (0.030)
Expense/Sales 0.070 −0.252∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.092) (0.167) (0.090)
Profitability −1.806∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 4.280∗∗∗ −0.915∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.103) (0.188) (0.101)
Depreciation/Total 6.253∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ −8.171∗∗∗ 4.668∗∗∗
Assets (0.591) (0.437) (1.049) (0.443)
One-year Stock 0.456∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
Return (0.027) (0.019) (0.034) (0.022)
Book Leverage 1.907∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ −2.356∗∗∗ 3.493∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.062) (0.169) (0.060)
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.122
No. of Obs. 84604 99111
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
(to be continued)
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Panel B: Multinomial Logit on Long-/ Mid-/ Short-term Institutional Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity Issue Debt Issue Equity Reduction Debt Reduction
Long-term IO −2.447∗∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.332) (0.152) (0.215) (0.160)
Mid-term IO −1.013∗∗∗ 0.144 1.312∗∗∗ 0.095
(0.186) (0.093) (0.149) (0.106)
Short-term IO 1.783∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ −0.464 ∗ ∗ −0.741∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.105) (0.188) (0.128)
Firm Size(Log of −0.195∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
Sales/CPI) (0.015) (0.008) (0.016) (0.010)
M/B 0.302∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.005 −0.187∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016)
Tangibility −0.173 0.404∗∗∗ −0.303∗ −1.030∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.075) (0.178) (0.083)
R&D 0.428 ∗ ∗ −1.975∗∗∗ −0.879 ∗ ∗ −1.215∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.275) (0.365) (0.234)
R&D dummy −0.099 ∗ ∗ −0.142∗∗∗ 0.075 0.052∗
(0.047) (0.026) (0.057) (0.030)
Expense/Sales 0.070 −0.237∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.091) (0.169) (0.091)
Profitability −1.877∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 4.350∗∗∗ −0.903∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.103) (0.193) (0.101)
Depreciation/Total 5.747∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ −7.797∗∗∗ 4.777∗∗∗
Assets (0.585) (0.434) (1.054) (0.444)
One-year Stock 0.407∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ −0.086 ∗ ∗ −0.059∗∗∗
Return (0.027) (0.019) (0.034) (0.022)
Book Leverage 1.851∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ −2.325∗∗∗ 3.517∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.062) (0.169) (0.060)
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.123
No. of Obs. 84604 99111
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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Table 2.7: Partial Adjustment Model: Speed of Adjustment
Regression results of specification 2.11: Leveragei,t = αTotalIOi,t−1 + Xi,t−1β + (1 −
λ1)Leveragei,t−1 + (1 − λ2)Leveragei,t−1 ∗ DummyHighTotalIO + δi,t; and specification 2.12:
Leveragei,t = α + κ1Long-termIOi,t + +κ2Mid-termIOi,t + +κ3Short-termIOi,t + (1 −
λ2)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighLong-termIO + (1− λ3)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighMid-termIO + (1−
λ4)Leveragei,t−1 ∗DummyHighShort-termIO+Xi,t−1β+(1−λ1)Leveragei,t−1 +δi,t. All variables are
defined in detail in the appendix. Column (1) reports the estimations results of specification 2.11,
column (2) estimates specification 2.12. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have
been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Dummy for High IO × Book Leverage 0.019∗∗∗ (0.004)
Total Institutional Ownership −0.007∗∗∗ (0.002)
Dummy for High LIO × Book Leverage 0.004 (0.004)
Dummy for High MIO × Book Leverage 0.011∗∗∗ (0.004)
Dummy for High SIO × Book Leverage 0.008∗∗ (0.004)
Long-term Institutional Ownership −0.018∗∗∗ (0.004)
Mid-term Institutional Ownership −0.012∗∗∗ (0.003)
Short-term Institutional Ownership 0.013∗∗∗ (0.004)
Log of Sales/CPI 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
M/B 0.001∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗ (0.000)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.020∗∗∗ (0.002)
R&D/Sales −0.045∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.047∗∗∗ (0.006)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.008∗∗∗ (0.001)
Expense/Sales 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Profitability −0.027∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.029∗∗∗ (0.004)
Depreciation/Total Assets 0.046∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.041∗∗∗ (0.015)
One-year Stock Return −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
Book Leverage 0.868∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.866∗∗∗ (0.004)
R2 0.753 0.753
No. of Obs. 92717 92717
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Table 2.8: Components of Change in Leverage
Column (1)-(6) respectively reports Fama-Macbeth regression results of specification 2.13 through
specification 2.18. Fama-MacBeth standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **,
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Debt Issue (∆Dt/At) Net Equity Issue (et/At) (∆REt/At)
Total IO 0.005 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Long-term IO −0.035∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Mid-term IO −0.002 −0.015∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Short-term IO 0.039∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Log of Sales/CPI −0.000 0.000 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.002 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007)
R&D/Sales −0.034∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.021
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Expense/Sales 0.008 ∗ ∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Profitability 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Depreciation/Total −0.028 −0.038∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ −0.694∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗∗
Assets (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.044) (0.044)
One-year Stock 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
Return (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Book Leverage −0.080∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.054 0.057 0.191 0.193 0.292 0.293
No. of Obs. 81981 81981 81981 81981 81981 81981
CHAPTER 2. HOW DO INSTITUTIONS AFFECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 70
T
ab
le
2.
9:
P
ec
k
in
g
or
d
er
te
st
s:
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
T
h
is
te
st
s
p
ec
k
in
g
or
d
er
b
y
re
gr
es
si
n
g
d
eb
t
is
su
e
or
re
d
u
ct
io
n
on
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t.
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ll
y,
co
lu
m
n
(1
)
re
p
o
rt
s
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
re
su
lt
s
of
∆
D
i,
t
=
α
+
β
P
O
D
E
F
i,
t
+
ζ
i,
t;
C
ol
u
m
n
(2
)
re
p
or
ts
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
2.
2
0
a
n
d
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
re
p
o
rt
s
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
2.
21
.
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
is
d
efi
n
ed
in
2.
19
.
H
ig
h
IO
/L
IO
/M
IO
/S
IO
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
a
b
ov
e
cr
o
ss
-
se
ct
io
n
al
m
ed
ia
n
in
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
n
et
d
eb
t
is
su
e
in
P
an
el
A
,
an
d
gr
os
s
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
is
su
e/
re
d
u
ct
io
n
in
P
an
el
B
/C
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
h
av
e
b
ee
n
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
h
et
er
os
ce
d
as
ti
ci
ty
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
in
g
a
t
th
e
fi
rm
le
v
el
.
A
st
er
is
k
s
**
*,
**
,
*
d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
N
et
D
eb
t
Is
su
e
(∆
D
t
/A
t
)
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.4
1
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
)
0
.3
8
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.3
9
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
7
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
IO
0
.0
0
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.0
7
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
L
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.2
3
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
0
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
M
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.0
7
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
0
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
S
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
−0
.1
5
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
L
IO
0
.0
0
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
M
IO
0
.0
0
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
S
IO
−0
.0
0
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
R
2
0
.3
3
2
0
.3
3
9
0
.3
7
6
N
o
.
o
f
O
b
s.
9
6
5
5
2
9
6
5
5
2
9
6
5
5
2
CHAPTER 2. HOW DO INSTITUTIONS AFFECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 71
T
ab
le
2.
10
:
P
ec
k
in
g
or
d
er
te
st
:
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t,
co
n
tr
ol
li
n
g
fo
r
fi
rm
si
ze
T
h
is
te
st
s
p
ec
k
in
g
or
d
er
b
y
re
gr
es
si
n
g
d
eb
t
is
su
e
or
re
d
u
ct
io
n
on
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
w
h
il
e
co
n
tr
ol
li
n
g
fo
r
th
e
si
ze
eff
ec
t.
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ll
y,
co
lu
m
n
(1
)
re
p
or
ts
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
∆
D
i,
t
=
α
+
β
P
O
D
E
F
i,
t
+
ζ
i,
t;
C
ol
u
m
n
(2
)
re
p
or
ts
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
o
f
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
2
.2
2
an
d
C
ol
u
m
n
(3
)
re
p
or
ts
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
2.
23
.
F
in
an
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
is
d
efi
n
ed
in
2.
19
.
H
ig
h
IO
/
L
IO
/
M
IO
/
S
IO
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
ab
ov
e
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
al
m
ed
ia
n
in
a
gi
ve
n
ye
ar
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
n
et
d
eb
t
is
su
e
in
P
a
n
el
A
,
a
n
d
g
ro
ss
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
is
su
e/
re
d
u
ct
io
n
in
P
an
el
B
/C
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
h
av
e
b
ee
n
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
an
d
cl
u
st
er
in
g
at
th
e
fi
rm
le
ve
l.
A
st
er
is
k
s
**
*,
**
,
*
d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
N
et
D
eb
t
Is
su
e
(∆
D
t
/A
t
)
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.3
6
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.0
9
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
)
0
.1
3
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
−0
.1
1
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
IO
0
.0
0
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
L
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
0
.0
9
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
M
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
−0
.0
2
0
∗∗
(0
.0
0
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
S
IO
×
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
−0
.2
2
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
L
IO
0
.0
0
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
M
IO
0
.0
0
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
fo
r
H
ig
h
S
IO
−0
.0
0
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
)
F
in
a
n
ci
n
g
D
efi
ci
t
×
F
ir
m
si
ze
0
.1
1
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
0
.1
1
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
0
.0
1
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
)
0
.0
0
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
)
0
.0
0
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
)
R
2
0
.3
7
1
0
.4
3
3
0
.4
6
0
N
o
.
o
f
O
b
s.
9
5
1
6
5
9
6
5
5
2
9
6
5
5
2
CHAPTER 2. HOW DO INSTITUTIONS AFFECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 72
Table 2.11: Pecking Order Test: (∆REt/At) / (CF −DIV )t/At
This tests pecking order by estimating ∆REi,t = α + βFinD
RE
i,t + τi,t in column (1) Panel A
and(CF −DIV )i,t = α + βFinD(CF−DIV )i,t + τi,t in column (1) Panel B. Column (2) reports esti-
mation results of specification 2.26 in Panel A and specification 2.28 in panel B.Column (3) reports
estimation results of specification 2.27 in Panel A and specification 2.29 in Panel B. Financing
Demand is defined in equation 2.24 and equation 2.25. High IO/LIO/MIO/SIO is defined as above
cross-sectional median in a given year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have
been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Financing Demand RE
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Retained Earnings (∆REt/At)
Financing Demand 0.492∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.534∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.560∗∗∗ (0.005)
Dummy for High IO × Financing Demand −0.133∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High IO 0.032∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High LIO × Financing Demand 0.031∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High MIO × Financing Demand −0.067∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High SIO × Financing Demand −0.140∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High LIO 0.019∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High MIO 0.021∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High SIO 0.014∗∗∗ (0.001)
No. of Obs. 94844 94844 94844
Panel B: Financing Demand (CF-DIV)
(1) (2) (3)
(CF −DIV )t/At
Financing Demand 0.345∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.393∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.421∗∗∗ (0.007)
Dummy for High IO × Financing Demand −0.140∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High IO 0.041∗∗∗ (0.002)
Dummy for High LIO × Financing Demand 0.016∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High MIO × Financing Demand −0.059∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High SIO × Financing Demand −0.139∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High LIO 0.016∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High MIO 0.022∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High SIO 0.026∗∗∗ (0.001)
No. of Obs. 94313 94313 94313
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Table 2.12: Pecking Order Test: (∆REt/At) / (CF −DIV )t/At
This table does the same test as Table 2.11 while controlling for size and its interaction with
Financing Demand. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Financing Demand RE
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Retained Earnings (∆REt/At)
Financing Demand 0.578∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.571∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.588∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High IO × Financing Demand −0.090∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High IO 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High LIO × Financing Demand 0.045∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High MIO × Financing Demand −0.045∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High SIO × Financing Demand −0.118∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High LIO 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High MIO 0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High SIO 0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
Financing Demand × Firm Size −0.025∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.002)
Firm Size 0.032∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.029∗∗∗ (0.001)
No. of Obs. 94844 94844 94844
Panel B: Financing Demand (CF-DIV)
(1) (2) (3)
(CF −DIV )t/At
Financing Demand 0.472∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.466∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.482∗∗∗ (0.010)
Dummy for High IO × Financing Demand −0.079∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High IO 0.017∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High LIO × Financing Demand 0.042∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High MIO × Financing Demand −0.029∗∗∗ (0.008)
Dummy for High SIO × Financing Demand −0.107∗∗∗ (0.009)
Dummy for High LIO −0.001 (0.001)
Dummy for High MIO 0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
Dummy for High SIO 0.018∗∗∗ (0.001)
Financing Demand × Firm Size −0.036∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.026∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.026∗∗∗ (0.003)
Firm Size 0.031∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.029∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.001)
No. of Obs. 94313 94313 94313
Chapter 3
Institutional Preferences for Leverage
3.1 Introduction
It is well documented that institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with certain char-
acteristics. Falkenstein (1996) find that share price level, volatility, liquidity, news coverage,
firm age, firm size, and idiosyncratic volatility are all related to mutual fund investment de-
cisions. Bennett et al. (2003) show that the aggregate institutional preferences are caused by
the changing preferences of each class of institutional investor, not by the changing propor-
tions of different classes. Badrinath et al. (1996) find that insurance companies’ preferences
are different from other institutional investors. Del Guercio (1996) reports that banks pre-
fer prudent stocks,whereas mutual funds do not. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that
institutions prefer large, liquid stocks with low past returns.
In this chapter, I study whether institutional investors have preferences for specific lever-
age ratios and whether their preferences affect firm capital structure decisions. I adopt the
measure used in Sulaeman (2010): firm-level aggregated preferred leverage of institutions. I
extend the measure by excluding the firm itself to remove mechanical endogeneity and by
separately calculating it for new, staying, and liquidating institutions.
74
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Consistent with Sulaeman (2010), I find that aggregated preferred leverage of all insti-
tutions with holdings in the firm is positively related to its leverage ratio.
This finding is consistent with two interpretations. First, it is possible that the firm lever-
age ratio is affected by the institutional preferences. Second, it is possible that institutions
simply invest in firms with certain capital structure policies.
To specifically test the second hypothesis I investigate the relation between the preferred
leverage of new institutional investors and the firms leverage. I find that aggregated preferred
leverage of new institutions is also strongly related to the firm leverage ratio. Since new
institutions have only recently become shareholders, this result can only be consistent with
the second scenario. This result differs from that of Sulaeman (2010), who interprets his
results as consistent with the first interpretation.
I use the one-step and the two-step partial adjustment model to examine if institutional
preferred leverage affects changes in firm leverage. Aggregated preferred leverage of new
institutions’ has a positive relationship to the change of firm leverage ratio. Since the insti-
tutions are new, it is unlikely for them to affect the firm’s capital structure choice.
In contrast, the relation between aggregated preferred leverage of liquidating institutions
and the change of firm leverage ratio is much weaker and is insignificant in some specifications
of the one-step model and in the two-step model. Since firms cannot foresee an institution’s
exit, it is unlikely they can choose to be affected by only the staying institutions. Hence, it is
likely that institutions sell the shares when the firm’s capital structure policies deviate from
the institution’s preference. This result is further confirmed in institution-firm-pair-level
data, where the individual liquidating choice is studied. The more the firm’s leverage ratio
deviates from the institution’s preferred leverage ratio, the more likely the institution will
liquidate its holdings.
I also examine the relationship between the aggregated preferred leverage of the institu-
tions and the firms’ financing decisions. The aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
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is positively related to the likelihood of issuing debt rather than equity and the likelihood of
repurchasing equity rather than debt. The aggregated preferred leverage of the liquidating
institutions is related to none of these financing choices, consistent with my prior results and
conclusions.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data, de-
scribes the variable definitions of the aggregated preferred leverage, and reports the sum-
mary statistics. Section 3.3 presents the firm-level empirical results on the relationship be-
tween aggregated preferred leverage and firm capital structure decisions. Section 3.4 checks
institution-firm-level data and directly studies institution’s liquidation decisions. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Data and Definitions
3.2.1 Data
I acquire firm-level data from the annual COMPUSTAT database and the monthly equity
CRSP stock return database. Following the literature, firms in the financial sector (SIC
codes 6000-6999) and the utility sector (SIC codes 4900-4999) are not included in the sample
because their capital structures are likely significantly different from those of firms in other
sectors. The balance sheet variables as a percentage of total assets or sales are trimmed to
remove the most extreme 1% in either tail of the distribution if the variable can be negative
or in the right tail only if the variable is positive by definition. Only ordinary common
shares, share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP, are kept in the sample.
The Thomson Financial 13F Institutional Holdings database is merged with the annual
COMPUSTAT database to access institutional ownership data. As Thomson provides the
institutions’ holdings on a quarterly base, the firm fiscal-year-end quarter in COMPUSTAT
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is used to merge the data with the latest institutional holdings data from the same quarter.
Because the Thomson Financial 13F Institutional Holdings database only keeps records
from 1980 and onwards, the final sample is limited to the 1980-2014 period. Only firms who
have at one point been held by an institutional investor are retained in the sample.
3.2.2 Institutional Preferred Leverage
Most institutions have an extensively diversified portfolio, and, as my sample shows, more
than 95% of the institutions hold greater than 10 firms in each quarter with the median
number of firms held as 110. I use the dollar-value-weighted average of the leverages of all
the firms in institution’s portfolio as a proxy for its preferred leverage ratio. For my studies’
point of interest, I exclude the firm itself when I calculate the preferred leverage ratio of an
institution for that specific firm, that is for institution k at year t, its preferred leverage ratio
observed by firm i is
Lev preferred
i
k,t =
∑
i,f∈Fk,t;f 6=i
[(V alueik,t/
∑
i,f∈Fk,t;f 6=i
V alueik,t) · Levit], (3.1)
where Fk,t is the set of all stocks held by institution k at the end of year t , V alue
i
k,t is the
dollar amount allocated to firm i by institution k at the end of year t, and f is any firm
other than firm i held by institution k at the end of year t .
Because firms have different fiscal-year-end quarters, I apply the fiscal-year-end leverage
to the following three quarters before the next fiscal year end, as this would most likely be
the observed leverage by institutions and by other firms. Most firms in my sample have
more than one institutional investor, more than 83% of firms have no less than 5 during each
quarter. To measure the aggregated institutional preferred leverage ratio that is observed
by, and possibly affects the firm’s capital structure, I use a share-weighted average of Lev
j
i,t,
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that is, for firm i, at year t the aggregated preferred leverage ratio of all its institutions is
Lev
k
i,t =
∑
k∈Fi,t
Sharesik,t·Lev preferred
i
k,t∑
k∈Fi,t
Sharesik,t
(3.2)
The above definition is similar in spirit to that of Sulaeman (2010). However, the main
difference is that I exclude the firm itself when I compute the preferred leverage of its
institutions. The advantage of my measure is that it ensures that the aggregated preferred
leverage ratio (Lev
k
i,t) is not affected by the firm’s own leverage.
I also define the aggregated preferred leverage ratio of new, staying, and liquidating
institutions as below. The rationale to also analyze the influence of new and liquidating
institutions is to help distinguish the effects between institutions choosing leverages ex ante
or affecting firm capital structure ex post.
Lev
kNew
i,t =
∑
k∈Fi,t,k /∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t·Lev preferred
i
k,t∑
k∈Fi,t,k /∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t
(3.3)
Lev
kStaying
i,t =
∑
k∈Fi,t,k∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t·Lev preferred
i
k,t∑
k∈Fi,t,k∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t
(3.4)
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t =
∑
k/∈Fi,t,k∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t−1·Lev preferred
i
k,t∑
k/∈Fi,t,k∈Fi,t−1
Sharesik,t−1
(3.5)
Institutions are defined as new if they are the shareholders at the current fiscal year end,
but not the previous fiscal year end; defined as staying if they are shareholders at both the
current and the previous fiscal year end; and defined as liquidating if they are shareholders
at the previous fiscal year end, but not going forward. Because liquidating institutions have
sold the shares of the firms, it is impossible to calculate the share-weighted average using
the current year’s weights. Thus I use the previous year’s holdings instead.
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3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the firms characteristics used in this chapter.
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of all aggregated preferred leverage at the firm-
level and estimated firm target leverage bases on the COMPUSTAT sample. As expected,
the aggregated preferred leverage has much less variation than the firm leverage or the
estimated firm target leverage. The aggregated preferred leverage of liquidating institutions
has fewer observations because, in the sample period, firms tend to be held by more and
more institutions over time, as indicated in Table 3.5.
Table 3.3 presents the correlation between all the leverage-based variables in Table 3.2.
Firm leverage is highly correlated to the estimated target leverage compared with the ag-
gregated preferred leverage, and this is not surprising as target leverage is estimated based
on the actual observed firm leverage. Compared with the aggregated preferred leverage of
liquidating institutions, firm leverage is more related to the new and staying leverages.
Table 3.4 presents the number of firms each institution hold over time. There is an obvious
trend of increasing institutions, but not a general trend for how many firms institutions hold.
Some become more concentrated over time, whereas others become more diversified.
3.3 Institutional Ownership and Leverage Ratio
3.3.1 Determinants of Book Leverage
In this section, I study whether or not the aggregated institutional preferred leverage ratio
(Lev
k
i,t) affects the firm leverage ratio. Book leverage, defined as the sum of the current
liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets, is used throughout my study. Insti-
tutional trading affects not only institutional holdings but also market leverage by affecting
stock price and market equity.
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I examine this by regressing observed book leverage ratio on the aggregated institutional
preferred leverage ratio (Lev
k
i,t) and a vector of conventional explanatory variables Xs, that
have been used in past studies of capital structure:
Levi,t = α + βLev
k
i,t +Xi,t · Γ + σi,t, (3.6)
Levi,t+1 = α + βLev
k
i,t +Xi,t · Γ + σi,t+1, (3.7)
where Xs include profitability, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, firm size, one-year stock
return, R&D expenditures/sales, an R&D dummy that indicates whether R&D information
is reported, selling expenses, and depreciation.
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results for the aggregated preferred leverage of all insti-
tutions (Lev
k
i,t); Table 3.7 for new institutions (Lev
kNew
i,t ); Table 3.8 for staying institutions
(Lev
kStaying
i,t ) and Table 3.9 for liquidating institutions (Lev
kLiquidating
i,t ). Columns (1) and (2)
in these four tables report results using pooled OLS; and columns (3) and (4) report results
using panel regression with firm fixed effect; and columns (5) and (6) report results using
the Fama-Macbeth method. In columns (1), (3), and (5), the dependent variable and in-
dependent variables are contemporaneous,that is, specification 3.6, and in column (2), (4),
and (6), the independent variables are lagged one period from the dependent variable, that
is, specification 3.7.
No matter which model I adopt, the aggregated preferred leverage of all, new, staying,
and liquidating institutions are positively related to firm-level leverage. Since my interest
variable is also a form of leverage ratio, the results presented here may be spurious. In the
following sections, my focus will be on whether the aggregated preferred leverage affects
firms’ financing decisions.
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3.3.2 Partial Adjustment
The previous section shows that the aggregated institutional preferred leverage ratio is not
only statistically significant but also economically significant to the level of firm book lever-
age. In this section, I study if it is relevant to the change of leverage ratio. In the literature,
the partial adjustment model is implemented to study what lengths the firm adjusts its cur-
rent leverage towards the target ratio by regressing the change in leverage ratio from t − 1
to t on the distance from the firm’s leverage ratio at the end of t − 1 to its target ratio of
period t. I adopt the partial adjustment model:
Levi,t = α +Xi,t · Γ + ρLevi,t−1 + ηi,t, (3.8)
Levi,t = α + βLev
k
i,t +Xi,t · Γ + ρLevi,t−1 + ηi,t, (3.9)
Again, I estimate models 3.8 and 3.9 for all, new, staying, and liquidating institutions and
report the results Tables 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13. respectively Columns (1) and (2) in
these four tables report results using pooled OLS; and columns (3) and (4) report results
using panel regression with firm fixed effect and columns (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In columns (1), (3), and (5), the independent variables exclude Lev
k
i,t, that
is, specification 3.8, and in columns (2), (4), and (6), the independent variables include
Lev
k
i,t, that is, specification 3.9.
Hovakimian and Li (2011) report that the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are most conserva-
tive for partial adjustment model. This is also observed in my estimation results. While for
all, new, and staying institutions have a positive effect on the change in leverage ratio regard-
less of which estimation method is used, this is not the case for liquidating institutions. The
Fama-MacBeth method suggests that preferences of liquidating institutions (Lev
kLiquidating
i,t )
do not significantly affect firm’s year-by-year change in leverage ratio.
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Models 3.8 and 3.9 are lagged models. I have also estimated the contemporaneous
models, and the results, which are not reported here for brevity, are qualitatively similar.
Equations 3.8 and 3.9 are a one-step approach that have been previously used in the
literature. However, because of the fact that my interest variables are leverage ratios, doubts
may arise that the results in Tables 3.10 through 3.13 are observed because the aggregated
preferred leverage ratios of institutions are proxies for firms’ target leverage ratio under the
trade-off theory. To address this, I adopt the two-step model of partial adjustment model:
Levi,t − Levi,t−1 = α + βLev
k
i,t + φLev
∗
i,t + λLevi,t−1 + τi,t, (3.10)
where
Lev∗i,t = Xi,t · Γ̂. (3.11)
The Xs here are the same as those used in specifications 3.6 to 3.9. The yearly 49 Fama-
French industry medians are also included in the target leverage ratio estimation model.
I strictly estimate Lev∗i,t following what Hovakimian and Li (2011)’s suggestion to ”essen-
tially eliminate the bias in favor of the target-adjustment hypothesis.” The historical fixed
effects component is used instead of the full-sample fixed effects component. The target
leverage Lev∗i,t and the lagged leverage Levi,t enter the model 3.10 separately, which is criti-
cal in this case as Lev
k
i,t is also a leverage ratio. If I use the deviation of firm leverage from
the firm target leverage (Lev∗i,t − Levi,t−1) and from the aggregated leverage of institutions
(Lev
k
i,t − Levi,t−1) respectively, (Lev
k
i,t − Levi,t−1) may be significant simply because of the
strong relationship between (Levi,t − Levi,t−1) and Levi,t−1.
The sample to estimate the target leverage Lev∗i,t is fully COMPUSTAT. To estimate
targets for the merged sample from 1980-2014, I estimate the target firm’s leverage using
the COMPUSTAT sample from 1970 and on ward to make sure that the historical fixed
effects component is based on relatively longer periods for the earlier years (early 1980s) in
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my merged sample. For brevity,the target leverage estimation results (equation 3.11) are not
reported.
Table 3.14 reports the results of second step (equation 3.10). To be conservative and
brief, I only estimate and report Fama-Macbeth estimation results. Column (1) suggests
that the aggregated preferred leverage of all institutions is positively related to the change
of firm leverage ratio, yet the significance level is only at 10%. Column (2) suggests that the
aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions positively ”affects” firms’ leverage change.
As discussed earlier, since it is not feasible for new institutions to influence the firm, this
result is actually evidence of institutions’ heterogeneous preferences for leverage. Columns
(3) and (4) show that the aggregated preferred leverage of staying or liquidating institutions
is not relevant to the change of firm leverage ratio when controlling for the target firm’s
leverage.
3.3.3 Debt-Equity Choice
The preceding partial adjustment section uses continuous study. One may argue that this
can arise regardless of firms actively taking into account the aggregated preferred leverage of
institutions. So in this section I intend to test whether aggregated preferences of institutions
matter when firms solely pay attention to firms that have taken financial actions that lead
to significant changes in their leverage ratio.
I define significant changes following the literature on the threshold of 5%; that is if firms
raises common equity, borrows straight debt, repurchases common equity, or retires straight
debt from year t− 1 to t in an amount that exceeds 5% of their total assets at the end of t.
Similar to the partial adjustment model, the debt-equity choice model also can be solved
in one step or two steps. For brevity and for the special attributes of my interest variable,
I adopt and report results for the two-step approach, though using the one-step approach
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 84
does not alter the results qualitatively. The two-step model is as follows:
Di,t = α + βLev
k
i,t + λLevi,t−1 +Xi,t−1 · Γ̂ + ζi,t (3.12)
, where Lev∗i,t = Xi,t−1 · Γ̂, is the same as indicated in equation 3.11, and Ws is a vector of
variables in Hovakimian et al. (2001)’s second-stage regression, including net operating loss
carry-forwards (NOLC), a dummy for missing NOLC, profitability, market-to-book ratios, a
dummy for M/B>1, a dilution dummy. I also estimate the model by excluding all Ws as a
robustness check, and the results are not affected either.
I estimate both the issuance and the reduction side of the model. Specifically, in the
issuance regression, I compare equity issuance with debt issuance, both of which are aimed
at raising money. Di,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms issue debt, and 0 if firms issue
equity; in the reduction regression, Di,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms retire debt,
and 0 if firms repurchase equity.
The essential difference to my interest is that equity issuance (debt reduction) will lead
to a decrease in leverage, whereas debt issuance (equity repurchase) will lead to an increase
in leverage. So if a firm concerns itself with the aggregated institutional preferred leverage
ratio (Lev
k
i,t−1), when its leverage is lower than Lev
k
i,t−1, that is, the gap is positive, the firm
should lean towards debt issuance over equity issuance to increase its leverage. In doing so,
the firm reduces the gap when it needs funding, and choose a equity repurchase over debt
reduction to increase its leverage in order to reduce the gap when it reduces external capital.
The target firm’s leverage is estimated in the same way as in the partial adjustment
section, and the same as the two-step approach in the partial adjustment model. The target
firm’s leverage, the aggregated preferred leverage of institutions, and book leverage enter the
model separately. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are also included.
Tables 3.17 and 3.18 report the results for the issuance and reduction decisions,respectively.
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 85
Surprisingly, only the higher aggregated preferred leverage of the staying institutions leads to
significantly more equity repurchase rather than debt reduction when firms reduce external
capital. The aggregated preferred leverage of all, new, and liquidating institutions does not
affect the debt-equity choice.
This seems quite unlikely at first glance as the aggregated preferred leverage is positively
related to the continuous change in leverage. However, considering what I have found in
Chapter 2, this actually may be driven by the fact that long- and mid-term institutions do
not pay close attention to the level of leverage ratios, so their ”preferred” leverage is an
average of leverage ratios that are the results of their pecking order preference, not their
preferred leverage. Thus looking into the aggregated preferred leverage of long-, mid-, and
short-term institutions may help determine whether or not this is the reason.
Another surprise in this set of results is that, when controlling for other firm character-
istics that may affect the debt-equity reduction choice, the target firm’s leverage (Lev∗i,t) is
no longer relevant to the decision either. On the other side, if I use the deviation of firm
leverage from target leverage (Lev∗i,t − Levi,t−1), the deviation always will be significantly
negative, which indicates that the significance of the deviation term comes from the book
leverage itself, not the estimated target leverage. Although not the focus of my study, this
proves what Hovakimian and Li (2011) documents: we can avoid getting spuriously signif-
icant estimates by separately entering the target leverage and the actual leverage into the
model.
3.4 Institutions’ Liquidation Choice
In this section, I study the institution-firm level instead of the firm level. This allows
me to study whether the difference between an individual institution’s preference and firm
leverage would lead to higher probability of the institution’s liquidation using the following
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 86
logit model:
DLiq
i
k,t+1 = α + β|Lev preferred
i
k,t − Levi,t|+Wi,t ·Θ + ik,t+1. (3.13)
Based on the model used in Yan and Zhang (2009) and Gompers and Metrick (2001), Ws
include the following nine firm characteristics::
Market Capitalization : share price times total shares outstanding at the fiscal year end
Firm Age : the number of years since firm’s first appearance in COMPUSTAT
Dividend Yield : cash dividend divided by share price at the end of the fiscal year
Market-to-Book : the sum of book value of debt and market capitalization, divided by
total assets at the end of the fiscal year end
Price : fiscal-year-end price
Turnover : annual turnover calculated from CRSP daily stock return data
Volatility : standard deviation of daily returns over the previous year
One-year stock return : annual stock return calculated from the CRSP daily stock return
S&P 500: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is included in the S&P 500, zero
otherwise
Among these nine variables, market capitalization, firm age, price, and turnover come in
the model in natural log forms since ownership is measured as a percentage. It is helpful to
have other variables as percentages or in natural logs (Gompers and Metrick (2001)). Those
nine firm characteristics can be roughly cut into three sets: first, to proxy for prudence,
firm size, age, dividend yield, and stock volatility are used (Del Guercio (1996)). Second,
to control for liquidity and transactions costs, firm size, share price, and stock turnover are
used (Falkenstein (1996); Bennett et al. (2003)). Lastly, to control for future stock returns,
past returns, market-to-book, and firm size are used (Fama and French (1992); Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993)).
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Table 3.19 reports the estimation results. Column(1) is the base model. Gompers and
Metrick (2001) documents that institutions prefer firms with larger firms, higher price, and
low past return. All these hold in Table 3.19 too, and these firms have lower probability of
being liquidated.
Column (2) includes my interest variable, |Lev preferredik,t−Levi,t|, whose coefficient is
positive. This means the larger difference, positive or negative, the more likely the firm is go-
ing to be liquidated. This is another piece of evidence that institutions have a heterogeneous
preference for leverage ratio.
3.5 Conclusion
Institutions have heterogeneous preferences for leverage ratios. They invest in firms who
match their preferences instead of requiring that firms adhere to their preferences.
I have presented several pieces of evidence. First, the aggregated preferred leverage of new
institutions is positively related to the firm’s leverage level, continuous change in leverage
ratios, and significant change in leverage ratios in the concurrent year. Since it is impossible
for the new institutions to affect the firm, the positive relationship only can be explained by
institutions’ choice of firms following in line with their preferences.
Second, the aggregated preferred leverage of liquidating institutions is not significantly
related to the firm’s continuous and significant change in leverage ratios in the concurrent
year, whereas the aggregated preferred leverage of staying institutions is. Since firms are
not able to fully predict which institutions are staying and which are liquidating, they can-
not choose staying institutions only. Based on the results, institutions exit when a firm’s
financing decisions deviate from their preference.
Third, institution-firm-level data directly test institution’s liquidation choices, and I find
that institutions are more likely to liquidate a firm whose leverage is too far from the insti-
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tutions’ preferred leverage.
The measures used in this paper allow for a larger sample than those used in other
institutional investor governance study and also can be extended to firm characteristics
other than leverage to study the role of institutional investors in other corporate finance
questions.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of firm characteristics
The table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics. Institutional Ownership is fraction of
shares outstanding owned by institutional investors in Thomson Financial 13F. Long-, Mid- and
Short Institutional Ownership are defined in detail in the context. Book Leverage is book debt
divided by total assets. Market-to-book is market equity plus book debt divided by total assets.
Firm age is the number of years since the first appearance in Compustat. Profitability is annual
operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Tangibility is quarterly total (net)
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. R&D is quarterly research and development
expenditures divided by total assets. R&D dummy is equal to zero if R&D is missing. NOLC is
the net operating loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of assets. NOLC dummy is equla to
zero if NOLC is missing. The dilution dummy is set to one when one minus the assumed tax rate
times yield on Moody’s Baa rated debt was less than a firm’s after tax earning-price ratios.
count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Total IO 114, 637 0.368 0.011 0.114 0.320 0.594 0.868
Profitability 109, 534 0.114 −0.220 0.053 0.131 0.207 0.361
M/B 113, 470 1.857 0.770 1.051 1.405 2.127 4.616
Dummy for M/B>1 114, 637 0.798 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tangibility 114, 504 0.281 0.029 0.104 0.222 0.401 0.751
Firm Size 114, 637 4.656 1.316 3.216 4.584 6.015 8.234
One-year Stock Return 103, 249 0.127 −0.618 −0.239 0.048 0.371 1.195
R&D 112, 413 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.262
R&D dummy 114, 637 0.645 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Firm age 114, 637 16.246 2.000 6.000 12.000 23.000 44.000
Market Capitalization 114, 549 1954.504 6.600 33.565 133.230 621.372 6411.501
Dividend Yield 113, 274 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.041
Annual Turnover 101, 754 13.042 1.429 4.210 8.578 17.278 40.859
Annual Volatility of Daily Return 104, 925 0.581 0.221 0.350 0.504 0.728 1.224
NOLC 114, 637 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 1.104
NOLC dummy 114, 637 0.739 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dilution Dummy 113, 490 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Selling Expenses 104, 089 0.309 0.055 0.139 0.239 0.384 0.794
Depreciation 110, 550 0.052 0.013 0.030 0.045 0.065 0.117
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of firm-level aggregated preferred leverage
This table reports the descriptive statistics of leverage related variables used in this chapter. De-
tailed definitions are in the context in equations 3.2 through 3.5.
count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Lev
k
i,t 98,491 0.215 0.171 0.195 0.214 0.233 0.260
Lev
kNew
i,t−1 92,561 0.215 0.167 0.194 0.214 0.235 0.266
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t−1 58,475 0.214 0.156 0.191 0.211 0.234 0.278
Lev
kStaying
i,t−1 87,601 0.215 0.170 0.195 0.214 0.233 0.260
Lev
kLIO
i,t−1 90,347 0.215 0.170 0.195 0.216 0.235 0.260
Lev
kMIO
i,t−1 90,759 0.212 0.165 0.191 0.211 0.231 0.262
Lev
kSIO
i,t−1 85,853 0.217 0.167 0.196 0.215 0.235 0.272
Levi,t 98,682 0.223 0.000 0.043 0.193 0.344 0.600
Lev∗i,t 90,119 0.234 0.008 0.100 0.217 0.333 0.542
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Table 3.3: Correlations between firm-level aggregated preferred leverage
This table reports the correlations between leverage and firm-level aggregated preferred leverage
variables used in this chapter. Detailed definitions are in the context in equations 3.2 through 3.5.
Lev
k
i,t Lev
kNew
i,t Lev
kLiquidating
i,t Lev
kSta
i,t Levi,t Lev
∗
i,t
Lev
k
i,t 1.0000
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.7554 1.0000
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 0.4638 0.3892 1.0000
Lev
kStaying
i,t 0.9605 0.5952 0.4579 1.0000
Levi,t 0.2632 0.2490 0.1500 0.2459 1.0000
Lev∗i,t 0.2404 0.2184 0.1340 0.2271 0.7770 1.0000
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics on the number of firms held by institutions over time
count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
1980 461 136 23 59 98 166 379
1981 487 138 21 58 98 165 402
1982 508 145 18 59.5 98.5 181 424
1983 565 155 18 58 101 191 467
1984 613 152 16 55 98 186 465
1985 676 155 14 51 96 180 487
1986 706 153 12 46 90.5 183 484
1987 754 165 15 50 95 201 503
1988 762 166 15 50 94.5 189 531
1989 802 164 12 48 94 185 532
1990 841 161 10 46 86 181 525
1991 864 171 13 47 90 197 554
1992 953 178 17 51 89 195 599
1993 903 191 14 52 92 194 642
1994 989 193 16 49 90 193 672
1995 1,126 197 15 48 89 190 718
1996 1,125 199 15 49 90 194 757
1997 1,257 202 12 47 90 179 794
1998 1,410 197 10 46 85 173 803
1999 1,473 207 9 45 86 188 880
2000 1,647 200 7 41 78 171 815
2001 1,520 207 9.5 42 77 173 924
2002 1,466 204 8 40 76 170 927
2003 1,402 221 10 43 80.5 191 1,062
2004 1,588 216 7 38 76 175 1,133
2005 1,797 196 7 34 70 162 893
2006 2,041 185 5 29 62 146 838
2007 2,306 171 4 26 59 138 748
2008 2,298 163 3 22 54.5 131 741
2009 2,248 167 4 26 59 139 717
2010 2,420 159 3.5 25 57 133 691
2011 2,565 150 3 23 53 126 657
2012 2,561 150 2 20 52 126 646
2013 2,980 148 2 21 53 128 632
2014 2,894 113 2 18 43 99 486
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics on the number of institutions a firm is held by over time
count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
1980 1,096 44.9 1 5 18 55 195
1981 1,607 35.6 1 3 11 39 161
1982 1,760 36 1 4 12 39 166
1983 2,097 36.3 1 5 13 38 165
1984 2,118 38.2 1 5 13 40 172
1985 2,158 42.7 1 6 16 44 195
1986 2,302 41.1 1 6 16 42 187
1987 2,437 45.1 2 6 16 45 208
1988 2,298 47.2 2 7 17 48 221
1989 2,368 50.3 1 7 20 52 225
1990 2,257 52.5 2 8 21 57 223
1991 2,480 52.1 2 9 22 56 218
1992 2,660 55.4 2 10 23 59 229
1993 3,219 50.1 2 9 22 53 202
1994 3,246 52.4 2 10 23 58 205
1995 3,360 58.3 3 11 27 64 217
1996 3,917 52.8 2 9 24 57 203
1997 3,895 58.6 2 10 27 67 214
1998 3,723 66.8 3 11 31 79 234
1999 3,599 76.2 3 13 38 92 272
2000 3,514 86.4 4 16 45 104 302
2001 3,078 93.6 4 18 55 116 319
2002 2,842 96.9 5 20 62 119 321
2003 2,761 101 4 22 70 128 319
2004 2,759 109 6 27 76 138 345
2005 2,701 113 6 27 74 143 365
2006 2,527 125 8 31 82 156 408
2007 2,385 134 8 29 81 162 453
2008 2,419 136 8 35 89 163 439
2009 2,320 141 8 38.5 93.5 168 451
2010 2,274 150 9 45 97 176 488
2011 2,145 160 10 46 99 189 513
2012 2,115 161 9 49 103 191 519
2013 2,263 182 11 58 117 211 584
2014 1,976 180 12 52 113 201 609
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 94
Table 3.6: Determinants of Book Leverage: Lev
k
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.6 and 3.7 for aggregated preferred leverage of all
institutions(Lev
k
i,t). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and
(4) report results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results
using Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the dependent variable and independent variables
are contemporaneous, i.e. specification 3.6, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables
are lagged one period of the dependent variable, i.e. specification 3.7. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in
Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Book Leverage Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1
Lev
k
i,t 0.983∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.061) (0.070)
Firm Size 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B −0.012∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.190∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
R&D −0.163∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
R&D dummy −0.039∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Selling Expenses −0.066∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Profitability −0.232∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015)
Depreciation/Total 0.157∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
Assets (0.023) (0.024) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052)
One-year Stock −0.006∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.005
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.194 0.175 0.170 0.148 0.208 0.191
No. of Obs. 91315 85808 91315 85808 91315 85808
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Book Leverage: Lev
kNew
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.6 and 3.7 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kNew
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4) report
results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the dependent variable and independent variables are
contemporaneous, i.e. specification 3.6, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables are
lagged one period of the dependent variable, i.e. specification 3.7. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in
Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Book Leverage Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.738∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.047) (0.053)
Firm Size 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.188∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
R&D −0.159∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.032∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
R&D dummy −0.042∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Selling Expenses −0.061∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
Profitability −0.232∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016)
Depreciation/Total 0.179∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
Assets (0.023) (0.025) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
One-year Stock −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.001
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.191 0.174 0.168 0.147 0.205 0.190
No. of Obs. 85518 80469 85518 80469 85518 80469
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Book Leverage: Lev
kStaying
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.6 and 3.7 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kStaying
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4) report
results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the dependent variable and independent variables are
contemporaneous, i.e. specification 3.6, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables are
lagged one period of the dependent variable, i.e. specification 3.7. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in
Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Book Leverage Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1
Lev
kStaying
i,t 0.913∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029) (0.052) (0.058)
Firm Size 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.186∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
R&D −0.157∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
R&D dummy −0.041∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Selling Expenses −0.060∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Profitability −0.232∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016)
Depreciation/Total 0.181∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
Assets (0.023) (0.025) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
One-year Stock −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗ −0.006∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.196 0.177 0.174 0.153 0.208 0.192
No. of Obs. 85666 80552 85666 80552 85666 80552
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 97
Table 3.9: Determinants of Book Leverage: Lev
kLiquidating
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.6 and 3.7 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kLiquidating
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4)
report results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results
using Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the dependent variable and independent variables
are contemporaneous, i.e. specification 3.6, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables
are lagged one period of the dependent variable, i.e. specification 3.7. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in
Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Book Leverage Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1 Levi,t Levi,t+1
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 0.400∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.041) (0.033)
Firm Size 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B −0.015∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tangibility 0.179∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008)
R&D −0.140∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.040∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.024) (0.043) (0.046)
R&D dummy −0.048∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.006 −0.042∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Selling Expenses −0.041∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.013 −0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Profitability −0.232∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
Depreciation/Total 0.242∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
Assets (0.029) (0.030) (0.061) (0.062) (0.050) (0.055)
One-year Stock −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.005
Return (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
R2 0.196 0.178 0.168 0.146 0.219 0.200
No. of Obs. 57312 54059 57312 54059 57312 54059
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Table 3.10: Partial Adjustment Model: Lev
k
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.8 and 3.9 for aggregated preferred leverage of all
institutions(Lev
k
i,t). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and
(4) report results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report re-
sults using Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the independent variables exclude Lev
k
i,t,
i.e. specification 3.8, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables include Lev
k
i,t, i.e.
specification 3.9. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level in Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Lev
k
i,t 0.087∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021)
Levi,t−1 0.881∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Size 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D −0.042∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.023∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Selling Expenses 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Profitability −0.024∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Depreciation 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020)
One-year Stock −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.761 0.762 0.757 0.757 0.767 0.767
No. of Obs. 85957 85808 85957 85808 85957 85808
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 99
Table 3.11: Partial Adjustment Model: Lev
kNew
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.8 and 3.9 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kNew
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4) report
results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the independent variables exclude Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specifica-
tion 3.8, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables include Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specification 3.9.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level in Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.080∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017)
Levi,t−1 0.881∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Size 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D −0.042∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Selling Expenses 0.004 0.005∗∗ 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.007∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Profitability −0.024∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Depreciation 0.037∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
One-year Stock −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.761 0.765 0.757 0.761 0.767 0.769
No. of Obs. 85957 80469 85957 80469 85957 80469
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Table 3.12: Partial Adjustment Model: Lev
kStaying
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.8 and 3.9 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kStaying
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4) report
results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the independent variables exclude Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specifica-
tion 3.8, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables include Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specification 3.9.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level in Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Lev
kStaying
i,t 0.080∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Levi,t−1 0.881∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Size 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D −0.042∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Selling Expenses 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Profitability −0.024∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Depreciation 0.037∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.020)
One-year Stock −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.761 0.765 0.757 0.761 0.767 0.770
No. of Obs. 85957 80552 85957 80552 85957 80552
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Table 3.13: Partial Adjustment Model: Lev
kLiquidating
i,t
Regression results of specification 3.8 and 3.9 for aggregated preferred leverage of new institutions
(Lev
kLiquidating
i,t ). Column (1) and (2) report results using pooled OLS, and column (3) and (4) re-
port results using panel regression with firm fixed effect and column (5) and (6) report results using
Fama-Macbeth. In column (1), (3) and (5), the independent variables exclude Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specifica-
tion 3.8, in column (2), (4) and (6), the independent variables include Lev
k
i,t, i.e. specification 3.9.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level in Column (1) to (4). Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS Panel with Firm FE Fama-Macbeth
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 0.023∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Levi,t−1 0.881∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Firm Size 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D −0.042∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.030∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
R&D dummy −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.002 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Selling Expenses 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.014∗ 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Profitability −0.024∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Depreciation 0.037∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.034 0.051∗∗ 0.045∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.028) (0.036) (0.021) (0.026)
One-year Stock −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.004∗∗
Return (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R2 0.761 0.779 0.757 0.775 0.767 0.778
No. of Obs. 85957 54059 85957 54059 85957 54059
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Table 3.14: Partial Adjustment Model: 2nd stage
Regression results of specification 3.10, 2nd stage of partial adjustment model, for aggregated
preferred leverage of all, new, staying and liquidating institutions. All columns are estimated using
Fama-Macbeth. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Levi,t − Levi,t−1
Lev
k
i,t 0.102∗∗∗
(0.017)
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.114∗∗∗
(0.016)
Lev
kStaying
i,t 0.074∗∗∗
(0.016)
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 0.009
(0.014)
Lev∗i,t 0.378∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Levi,t−1 −0.381∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗ −0.362∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
R2 0.188 0.187 0.173 0.157
No. of Obs. 89736 84067 83946 56237
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 103
Table 3.15: Partial Adjustment Model: 2nd stage, sort on the Difference between Firm
Target and Institutional Preferred Leverage
Regression results of specification 3.10, 2nd stage of partial adjustment model, for aggregated
preferred leverage of all, new, staying and liquidating institutions. I calculate (Lev∗i,t − Lev
k
i,t−1/
Lev
kNew
i,t−1 / Lev
kStaying
i,t−1 / Lev
kLiquidating
i,t−1 ), sort them into two groups within both negative and positive
values. Column (1)/(2)/(3)/(4) in order reports from the group with the most negative difference
to the group with the most positive difference. All columns are estimated using Fama-Macbeth.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Levi,t − Levi,t−1
Panel A: Preferred Leverage Calculated using All Institutions
Lev
k
i,t 0.041∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.037) (0.047) (0.029)
Lev∗i,t 0.500∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Levi,t−1 −0.468∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.429∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
R2 0.240 0.159 0.159 0.228
No. of Obs. 22296 22301 22619 22520
Panel B: Preferred Leverage Calculated using New Institutions
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.052∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.031) (0.038)
Lev∗i,t 0.495∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Levi,t−1 −0.452∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
R2 0.231 0.166 0.152 0.229
No. of Obs. 21141 21145 20937 20844
(to be continued)
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 104
Table 3.15 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Levi,t − Levi,t−1
Panel C: Preferred Leverage Calculated using Staying Institutions
Lev
kStaying
i,t 0.004 0.128∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.037) (0.047) (0.030)
Lev∗i,t 0.473∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.032) (0.034) (0.024)
Levi,t−1 −0.442∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
R2 0.217 0.153 0.149 0.212
No. of Obs. 21176 21165 20843 20762
Panel D: Preferred Leverage Calculated using Liquidating Institutions
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 0.019 0.010 0.008 0.023
(0.027) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031)
Lev∗i,t 0.421∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.026)
Levi,t−1 −0.371∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
R2 0.181 0.137 0.137 0.200
No. of Obs. 14486 14487 13654 13610
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Table 3.16: Partial Adjustment Model: 2nd stage,in the presence of disagreement between
Firm Target and Institutional Preferred Leverage
Regression results of specification 3.10, 2nd stage of partial adjustment model, for aggregated
preferred leverage of all, new, staying and liquidating institutions. Column (1)/(2)/(3)/(4) re-
spectively only include the firms whose leverage ratio is between Lev
k
i,t−1/ Lev
kNew
i,t−1 / Lev
kStaying
i,t−1 /
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t−1 and Lev
∗
i,t. All columns are estimated using Fama-Macbeth. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Levi,t − Levi,t−1
Lev
k
i,t −0.005
(0.028)
Lev
kNew
i,t 0.018
(0.021)
Lev
kStaying
i,t −0.019
(0.033)
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t −0.009
(0.023)
Lev∗i,t 0.420∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023)
Levi,t−1 −0.417∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024)
R2 0.138 0.137 0.099 0.083
No. of Obs. 24184 22846 21107 13979
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Table 3.17: Debt-Equity Issuance Choice
Logit regression results of specification 3.12. Dependent variable is DIi,t, a dummy variable equal
to 1 if firms issue debt, and 0 if firms issue equity. Column (1), (2), (3) and (4) report results
respectively with aggregated preferred leverage of all, new, staying and liquidating institutions.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
(to be continued)
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Table 3.17 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DIi,t; Debt (1) vs. Equity (0) Issuance
Lev
k
i,t 5.323∗∗∗
(0.918)
Lev
kNew
i,t 5.144∗∗∗
(0.781)
Lev
kStaying
i,t 2.190∗∗∗
(0.820)
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t 1.111
(0.756)
Firm Size 0.190∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
M/B −0.264∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
Tangibility 0.632∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.151) (0.149) (0.198)
R&D −2.548∗∗∗ −2.509∗∗∗ −2.622∗∗∗ −2.610∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.412) (0.417) (0.528)
R&D dummy 0.002 −0.011 −0.010 −0.064
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.075)
Selling Expenses −0.370 ∗ ∗ −0.293∗ −0.324 ∗ ∗ −0.118
(0.148) (0.152) (0.150) (0.192)
Profitability 1.263∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.197) (0.194) (0.266)
Depreciation/Total −2.990∗∗∗ −2.766∗∗∗ −3.239∗∗∗ −3.166∗∗∗
Assets (0.796) (0.828) (0.812) (1.062)
One-year Stock −0.289∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
Return (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.050)
Book Leverage −1.729∗∗∗ −1.709∗∗∗ −1.676∗∗∗ −1.683∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.129) (0.126) (0.166)
Dummy for M/B>1 −0.179∗∗∗ −0.136 ∗ ∗ −0.182∗∗∗ 0.157∗
(0.065) (0.068) (0.066) (0.090)
Dilution Dummy 0.534∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.067)
NOLC −0.238∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.046) (0.043) (0.061)
NOLC dummy 0.108 ∗ ∗ 0.104 ∗ ∗ 0.111 ∗ ∗ 0.095
(0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.065)
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.222 0.213 0.237
No. of Obs. 18936 17672 18429 11712
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR LEVERAGE 108
Table 3.18: Debt-Equity Reduction Choice
Logit regression results of specification 3.12. Dependent variable is DRi,t, a dummy variable equal
to 1 if firms retire debt, and 0 if firms repurchase equity. Column (1), (2), (3) and (4) report results
respectively with aggregated preferred leverage of all, new, staying and liquidating institutions.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
(to be continued)
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Table 3.18 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRi,t; Debt (1) vs. Equity (0) Reduction
Lev
k
i,t −5.246∗∗∗
(1.434)
Lev
kNew
i,t −4.440∗∗∗
(1.099)
Lev
kStaying
i,t −3.507 ∗ ∗
(1.377)
Lev
kLiquidating
i,t −0.842
(0.870)
Firm Size −0.369∗∗∗ −0.375∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026)
M/B −0.402∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.482∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.054)
Tangibility −1.143∗∗∗ −1.181∗∗∗ −1.141∗∗∗ −1.191∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.294) (0.291) (0.341)
R&D −0.346 −0.339 −0.371 −0.105
(0.607) (0.619) (0.618) (0.734)
R&D dummy 0.045 0.048 0.044 0.117
(0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.101)
Selling Expenses −1.621∗∗∗ −1.592∗∗∗ −1.599∗∗∗ −1.506∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.262) (0.265) (0.311)
Profitability −4.352∗∗∗ −4.249∗∗∗ −4.290∗∗∗ −3.871∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.359) (0.358) (0.457)
Depreciation/Total 13.777∗∗∗ 13.372∗∗∗ 13.678∗∗∗ 14.433∗∗∗
Assets (1.721) (1.740) (1.726) (2.070)
One-year Stock 0.296∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
Return (0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.073)
Book Leverage 9.863∗∗∗ 9.695∗∗∗ 9.800∗∗∗ 9.429∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.367) (0.366) (0.402)
Dummy for M/B>1 −0.506∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.091) (0.089) (0.112)
Dilution Dummy −0.732∗∗∗ −0.708∗∗∗ −0.739∗∗∗ −0.807∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.075)
NOLC 0.243∗ 0.269∗ 0.240∗ 0.226
(0.130) (0.138) (0.128) (0.165)
NOLC dummy −0.042 −0.054 −0.042 −0.071
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.087)
Pseudo R2 0.468 0.460 0.466 0.458
No. of Obs. 14545 13390 14250 9356
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Table 3.19: Institutions’ Liquidation Choice
Logit regression results of specification 3.13. This regression is on institution-firm pair level. De-
pendent variable is DLiq
i
k,t+1, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution liquidates the firm, and
0 if the institution stays as shareholders of the firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
and have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Liquidateik,t+1(1) vs. Stay
i
k,t+1(0)
|Lev preferredik,t − Levi,t| 0.181∗∗∗ (0.042)
Log of Market Capitalization −0.096∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.095∗∗∗ (0.008)
Log of Firm age −0.063∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.062∗∗∗ (0.007)
Dividend Yield −1.741∗∗∗ (0.383) −1.760∗∗∗ (0.379)
M/B −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.004)
Log of Fiscal Ending Price −0.036∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.032∗∗∗ (0.010)
Log of Annual Turnover 0.297∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.294∗∗∗ (0.009)
Annual Volatility of Daily Return −0.023 (0.030) −0.024 (0.030)
S&P 500 −0.147∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.146∗∗∗ (0.015)
One-year Stock Return 0.065∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.008)
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.020
No. of Obs. 4660284 4659217
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